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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates whether citizens are willing to make tradeoffs
between descriptive and substantive representation. Answering this ques-
tion is critical to efforts to maximize satisfaction with government for both
minorities and members of the majority. This study makes four main contri-
butions. First, it investigates how citizens, not scholars, evaluate descriptive
and substantive representation. Although the stockpile of studies on the two
types of representation has grown dramatically, the citizen’s perspective has
been noticeably absent. Second, in using an experiment, the study estimates
not only the independent effects of the two aspects of representation, but
also the interactive effects, which in turn speaks to how willing citizens are
to make tradeoffs. Third, the study facilitates deriving implications for maxi-
mizing satisfaction with governmental decisions across majority and minority
groups. Finally, the study investigates the role of innumeracy in shaping peo-
ple’s preferences for representation. I find that maximizing satisfaction for
both minorities and the majority is indeed possible. Proportional or higher
descriptive representation compensates for unfavorable substantive represen-
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Representation has consequences. In Oakland in 1966, there was a marked
lack of diversity on the city’s police force. Though the city was over 20%
black, the police department only had 16 black officers out of over 600 total
officers. At the same time, there were high levels of distrust of the government
– and the police force in particular – in Oakland’s black community. Each of
these facts could be seen as troubling in its own right. But taken together,
they formed an explosive situation.
Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panther Party in 1966,
ostensibly as an effort to protect the black community against mistreatment
by the Oakland police department. Members of the Black Panther Party pa-
trolled streets in predominantly black neighborhoods openly carrying loaded
shotguns. This tinderbox situation led to many violent encounters with law
enforcement, and marked a dark time during the broader societal gains of
the Civil Rights Movement.
In Oakland in 1966, issues of diversity, representation, and trust were
inexorably linked. The police force was not representative of the community
it served; only 2% of the police force shared the identity of the substantial
black community they were policing. Whether the presence of more black
officers would have ameliorated the distrust of police and government officials
in the black community can never be known. But, taken together, a lack of
trust and low levels of diversity among public servants led to a dangerous
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combination.
This is obviously an extreme example, but it is not an isolated one. The
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (a.k.a, the
Kerner Report) (1968) cited a lack of representation as a fundamental cause
of the race riots of the early 1960’s. This was a time in which blacks were
largely excluded from the political process, both as voters and as elected
officials, and achieved little penetration into the ranks of civil service. The
violent clashes that broke out in many cities across the country are indicative
of the damage that can be done by such a lack of representation and resulting
distrust of and dissatisfaction with government.
In the decades since the Kerner Report, numerous academic studies have
verified the link between citizens’ perception of the fairness of government
and respect for the rule of law. Tom Tyler’s work on procedural justice has
found that when decisions are judged as being made fairly, they are much
more likely to be obeyed, even without a compliance mechanism (Tyler and
Degoey, 1995). Tyler and coauthors have found similar links between per-
ceived fairness and respect for and cooperation with the police (Tyler and
Wakslak, 2004; Tyler and Fagan, 2006), and others have found linkages be-
tween the perceived legitimacy of government and anti-system behaviors (cf.
Muller, Jukam and Seligson, 1982; Booth and Seligson, 2005). These specific
consequences of fairness are part of broader linkages between representation,
fairness perceptions, legitimacy, and the rule of law (Tyler, 2003; Tankebe,
2009; Hough et al., 2010).
In short, representation matters. The link between representation and
trust in government can be consequential, for behaviors and for attitudes,
and this dissertation further examines this link. I examine how two aspects
of representation — descriptive and substantive — affect perceptions of the
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fairness of decision-making. I do so with a primary concern of comparing how
members of minority groups and the majority differ in their preferences for
different aspects of representation. I argue that understanding both minority
and majority group members’ representation preferences and priorities is
crucial, especially if we seek to design institutions that generate legitimate
policy outcomes and maximize satisfaction across societal groups.
1.1 Representation
In her seminal work, Pitkin (1972) lays out four concepts of representation
including two of immediate importance here: descriptive, and substantive.
Descriptive representation occurs when officials “look like” those they rep-
resent. To be more specific, descriptive representation requires that elected
officials come from the same social or identity group as their constituents. We
then would observe descriptive representation whenever a black constituent
is represented by a black member of Congress, a female constituent by a
female mayor, etc.
Substantive representation is concerned with the extent to which elected
officials behave in accordance with constituents’ policy preferences. Rather
than being focused on the composition of representative institutions, sub-
stantive representation is focused on the output of these institutions. One
way to conceptualize substantive representation is through the policy con-
gruence between constituents and their representatives (Miller and Stokes,
1963; Kuklinski and Elling, 1977). When elected officials share their con-
stituents’ policy preferences (and act on those policy preferences), then we
can say that citizens are substantively represented.
Scholarship on representation is nothing new, but representation is a two-
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sided relationship between representatives and constituents. Scholarly work
on the citizen side of the representation link has been underdeveloped. Schol-
arly inquiries on representation have focused primarily on concerns about
democratic ideals. How should representatives behave in order to fulfill
their fiduciary responsibility to constituents? Should they act as delegates
or trustees? And how shall we balance majoritarian principles against the
imperative of protecting minorities?
Noticeably absent from the questions above are any references to citizens’
preferences. In other words, we ask “How should representatives act,” not
“How do citizens want their representatives to act.” These are different
questions. The former, by focusing on “should” is necessarily informed by
democratic theory – how government ought to work. The latter, by focusing
on citizens’ wishes, is informed instead by the empirical reality of public
attitudes toward government.
Both questions are important to address, but in this project I focus on the
latter. Starting with theories of procedural justice and process preferences,
I develop the notion of representation preferences. I argue that citizens hold
preferences for different aspects of representation, and that they can priori-
tize one aspect over another. I use the idea of representation preferences to
see how citizens respond to and evaluate descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation.
1.2 Advancing the study of representation
One of the fundamental challenges of governance in the U.S. is the existence
of groups that constitute a permanent minority of the population. As such,
they will almost never make up a majority of governing institutions, and so
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the assurance that they will be represented is tenuous at best. In the past 50
years, the U.S. Government has worked to try to improve the representation
of these minority groups — particularly blacks and Latinos — through the
creation of majority-minority districts at the Federal level. This does not
come without some cost, since maximizing the number of blacks and Latinos
elected to the U.S. House may also decrease the total number of liberal
House members. As a result, there are fewer like-minded representatives in
Congress as a whole to represent blacks and Latinos which could in turn lead
to substantively worse policy outcomes for those groups.
The logic here is that in order to create districts that are majority-minority,
you must take minorities who were previously spread across several districts
and pack them into a single majority-minority district. Those districts that
used to contain substantial minority populations will be left with redistricted
populations that are more white and more conservative. Because of these po-
litical realities, members of permanent minority groups must make tradeoffs
between aspects of representation. And understanding how members of these
groups make tradeoffs is crucial to maximizing their satisfaction with demo-
cratic decision-making.
How then should we structure institutions in light of the need to make
tradeoffs between the diversity of elected officials and the policy outcomes of
government, especially with regard to permanent minority groups? The best
approach, I argue, is to ask citizens to evaluate this tradeoff. If our interest
is in maximizing satisfaction with government across groups in society (and
I argue that it should be), then we need to know how important different as-
pects of representation are to different groups in society. It might be the case
that some groups greatly prefer having elected officials who share their iden-
tity and background; other groups might prefer having a legislature that is as
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close as possible to their ideal position on the issues; still others might care
most about having elected officials who focus more on constituent service and
care less about actual policy positions. Until we know more about citizens’
priorities in the domain of representation, we do not know how to structure
representative institutions to maximize satisfaction with government.
Directly studying the effects of representation and citizens’ preferences
about representation is no easy feat. More often than not, we cannot readily
identify when two or more types of representation are at odds. For example,
we might ask which is more important: having a representative who shares
your identity and background, or having a representative who votes in line
with your policy preferences. We could design a study where we compare
citizens’ attitudes when their representatives “look like” them, and when
their representatives “vote like” them. But a problem is immediately obvi-
ous – what if representatives who share your identity also share your policy
preferences? To the extent that these two forms of representation (identity
and policy) overlap, we will be unable to identify which, if either, is more
important. Since it would be difficult to observe each of these conditions
independently in the real world, I investigate these different situations using
experiments. Experiments allow me to manipulate each aspect of represen-
tation independently. This facilitates studying both the independent and
joint/interactive effects of two (or more) aspects of representation.
For this project, I will be focusing on two aspects of representation: de-
scriptive and substantive representation. I will also be looking across mem-
bers of two groups in society: whites and blacks. Doing so will allow me to
investigate how members of each group make tradeoffs about the two aspects
of representation.
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1.3 Divergence from the existing literature
As I have suggested, I diverge from the existing literature on representation
in a few ways. First, I examine how citizens, not elites or scholars, evaluate
representation. Second, I look at two aspects of representation independently
and jointly. Third, I focus on maximizing satisfaction across groups in society
rather than focusing on a single group. Finally, I explore what might shape
peoples’ preferences about representation including the role of context and
personal ideology.
On the first point, I investigate representation looking from the bottom up.
I ask what citizens’ preferences and priorities are for different aspects of rep-
resentation. This is very different from much of the literature, which focuses
on aspects of representation as an end in and of themselves, or for their
instrumental value. On the former point, many studies have investigated
ways to boost one form of representation or another, with little discussion
of whether that is what citizens actually want. Much of the literature on
majority-minority districts, for example, hinges on a debate about whether
creating such districts damages substantive representation in favor of de-
scriptive representation. Rare is a discussion of whether minorities would be
willing to make such a sacrifice.
A great number of studies have investigated whether one aspect of rep-
resentation or another has effects on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors. In
particular, there is a growing literature on the effects of descriptive represen-
tation on citizens’ behaviors. The literature investigates whether descriptive
representation leads to greater contact with representatives, increased knowl-
edge, or higher voter turnout. These are all important behaviors. But by
focusing on them, we are studying representation only for what it does. These
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outcomes might be congruent with or orthogonal to what citizens actually
desire. We should be cautious of making broad suggestions about whether a
given form of representation is beneficial without taking into account what
citizens actually want. For example, we might see it as theoretically de-
sirable to increase the number of access points citizens have on political
decision-making processes. But it is dubious whether this is actually in line
with what citizens prefer (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). By focusing on
these instrumental goals, we lose sight of the citizen portion of the citizen-
representation link. I argue that we should refocus our attention on what
citizens actually want, rather than what drives changes in citizen behavior.
In addition to focusing on the citizen, I also investigate two aspects of
representation independently and together. A common problem that has
already been stated above is that different aspects of representation often go
together. I address this by using an experiment in which I manipulate each
aspect of representation independently. Such approaches are relatively rare
in the literature on representation.
Third, I focus on maximizing satisfaction via representation across mul-
tiple groups in society. The preponderance of literature on representation
is focused on one group only. Usually the group is a minority group, and
the question is whether some aspect of representation has beneficial conse-
quences for that group. But some studies have pointed out that augmenting
one group’s representation may have negative consequences for other groups
in society (Gay, 2001; Ulbig, 2005). As a result, looking at any one group in
isolation might miss the bigger picture. We might be increasing the satisfac-
tion of a minority group while simultaneously decreasing the satisfaction of
the majority.
To address this, I investigate the reactions of both whites and blacks to
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higher levels of black representation. I look at whether blacks and whites
respond differently to increases in black descriptive and substantive repre-
sentation. In so doing, I am able to speak to how increasing representation for
one group might (or might not) negatively affect the satisfaction of another
group. This sort of analysis is critical if we wish to make broad suggestions
about how to structure democratic representation in societies where groups
may have very different interests.
Finally, I explore what might shape peoples’ preferences for and priori-
ties between aspects of representation. I first investigate the role of context
on representation preferences. By context, I refer to the demographic com-
position of a person’s community. A person who lives in a predominantly
black community may have vastly different preferences for black descriptive
and substantive representation than one who lives in a predominantly white
community.
To this end, I incorporate both citizen’s actual community composition
(as measured by Census information on their city) as well as their perceived
community composition (as measured by their own estimate of the size of
different groups in their community). Using these two measures of context, I
ask whether attitudes towards representation are shaped by the relative sizes
of groups in the community in which people live.
In addition, personal ideology might shape preferences for representation.
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) find that ideology shapes general prefer-
ences about political processes, and it would be reasonable to expect the
same to be true for specific preferences about representation. For this rea-
son, I will explore if ideology acts as a moderator of levels of substantive and
descriptive representation.
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1.4 Plan for the dissertation
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical
framework for the project. I discuss the important challenges posed by per-
manent minority groups, overview the extant literature on the effects of rep-
resentation, and develop the notion of representation preferences. I then lay
out expectations for both members of the majority and minority groups with
regards to different aspects of representation.
Chapter 3 presents experimental evidence that the composition and policy
decisions of local decision-making bodies can affect citizens’ perceptions of
fairness of the process and satisfaction with the composition of the decision-
making body. I describe an experiment that manipulates both the composi-
tion of a decision-making body and its ultimate policy output. I investigate
the direct effect of composition by looking across levels of descriptive repre-
sentation for a minority group and the majority. I then investigate the direct
effects of substantive representation by looking at whether the outcome of
the decision-making process favors the majority or a minority group. I find
that both substantive and descriptive representation have important effects
on citizens’ perceptions of fairness and satisfaction.
The following chapter expands upon the experimental results by looking at
the interactions between the two aspects of representation. By investigating
interactions, I am able to determine whether and how citizens make tradeoffs
between the two aspects of representation. Chapter 4 finds that citizens,
particularly members of permanent minority groups, are willing to make
tradeoffs between different aspects of representation. I find that high levels of
descriptive representation can compensate for unfavorable policy outcomes
among members of a minority group. I also address the question of how
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members of the majority react to higher levels of minority representation
and find that evaluations of fairness and satisfaction do not degrade when
minority representation is high.
I complicate the effects of representation in Chapter 5. In this chapter,
I introduce the complication of racial context and ideology. Context poses
two important challenges to the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4. First is
that experimental subjects reside in widely varying residential contexts. As
a result, 15% descriptive representation of blacks does not mean the same
thing for subjects living in predominantly white versus diverse communities.
Second, citizens’ perceptions of racial context should also matter. It is not
only the objective diversity of a community that should affect evaluations of
representation — how people perceive their communities should matter too.
I investigate these complications by conditioning experimental treatments on
actual and perceived community context. This chapter also explores the role
played by ideology in shaping representation preferences. Although this work
is exploratory, it does raise interesting questions about how people form and
maintain their preferences regarding representation.






The existence of permanent minority groups1 in democratic societies poses at
least two challenges for representation. First, members of the minority group
will almost certainly be, and remain, a minority of members on decision-
making bodies, ranging from Congress to city councils and school boards.
Second, to the extent that the members of the majority and of the minority
take adversarial positions on crucial issues, the minority group’s preferred
policies are unlikely to be reflected, to any great extent, in actual policy
outcomes.2
Designers of democratic institutions might try to overcome the first chal-
lenge by finding ways to boost the proportion of minority group members on
decision-making bodies. That is, they could seek to reduce the gap between
the descriptive representation of the majority and the minority, perhaps by
creating majority-minority districts that would ensure the election of a minor-
ity representative. They might also address the second challenge by creating
institutions that generate policies closer to minority groups’ preferences, i.e.,
1By permanent minority group, I simply mean an identifiable group in society that
comprises a numerical minority, and due to the slow nature of population changes, this
minority status is unlikely to change. The present study will investigate blacks as a per-
manent minority group, but other groups, such as Latinos, Asian Americans, or members
of the LGBT community could be considered permanent minority groups as well. I will
hereafter refer to a singular such minority group for the sake of clarity.
2Both of these challenges are, of course, contingent upon the size of the minority group.
Minority groups that comprise 40% of the population are likely to have much more sub-
stantive and descriptive representation than are groups that only comprise 10% of the
population.
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that increase the substantive representation of minorities, such as establish-
ing a local consent decree with a vulnerable minority population regarding
school decisions.
Designing institutions for the purposes of addressing majority/minority
representation in democratic societies is difficult due to the tradeoffs required
in balancing descriptive and substantive representation. Efforts to boost one
form of representation might undermine the other, as is the case with the
creation of majority-minority districts (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran,
1996). Moreover, efforts to boost the representation of a minority group will
necessarily come at the cost of majority representation whenever majority-
minority preferences are at odds. Assuming no major restructuring of demo-
cratic institutions, increasing the numbers of black legislators requires that
we reduce the numbers of white (or Latino, Asian, Native American, etc.)
legislators by the same amount. And where members of permanent minority
groups differ in their policy preferences from the majority, any policy conces-
sions for minority groups requires that we ignore the policy preferences of the
majority. Both of these decreases are problematic in theory and in practice.
In practice, several studies have found that increases in minority descriptive
representation are linked to lower levels of civic engagement and trust among
whites (Gay, 2001; Barreto, Segura and Woods, 2004; Ulbig, 2005). And in
theory, giving preferential treatment to the policy concerns of the minority
undermines basic principles of majority rule.3 For these reasons, designing
institutions for the purposes of addressing majority/minority representation
in democratic societies requires identifying how highly members of the ma-
jority and the minority value descriptive and substantive representation. It
3But it is important to note that such concerns may not be as consequential when it
comes to non-adversarial forms of democracy, such as deliberation.
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also requires knowing whether and how members of both groups are will-
ing to balance substantive and descriptive representation. Most crucially of
all, is there some combination of the two aspects of representation that ap-
pears to maximize overall satisfaction of both majority- and minority-group
members?
Answering these questions has important implications and consequences
for democratic governance. Put simply, whether and how well groups are
represented has consequences. With this in mind, the present study makes
four main contributions. First, it investigates how citizens, not scholars, eval-
uate descriptive and substantive representation. Although the stockpile of
studies on the two types of representation has grown dramatically, relatively
few focus on citizens’ preferences and priorities. Second, because this study
uses an experiment, it facilitates estimating not only the independent effects
of each aspect of representation, but also their interactive effects, which in
turn speaks to how citizens make tradeoffs (if they make them at all). Third,
the study facilitates deriving implications for maximizing satisfaction with
representation across groups. Finally, this study takes into account the effect
of perceptions of group size, and how those perceptions shape preferences for
representation.
2.1 Representation and its consequences
Representation is important both for what it is and what it does. Viewed
through the lens of democratic theory, representation is a fundamental re-
quirement of any modern democracy — without representation, democratic
governance is impossible. But representation has instrumental value as well.
Many scholars have argued that enhancing the descriptive representation of
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minority groups will have important beneficial consequences for those minor-
ity groups. The expectation here is that having a representative “like you”
will increase the likelihood that the representative will be sensitive to your
needs, vote in line with your interests, and be active on issues of importance
to your group (Mansbridge, 1999). This should, in turn, lead to greater sat-
isfaction with government outcomes, trust in government (and government
officials), greater feelings of efficacy and political incorporation, and increased
attention to and knowledge of politics. In terms of political behaviors, we
should expect to see greater political engagement, especially in the form of
voting and contacting elected officials.
Empirical findings do not paint nearly so rosy a picture. While many
studies have found significant effects of representation on the attitudes and
behaviors described above, the results are often mixed, contradictory, or non-
existent. In addition, a number of studies have suggested that increasing
minority representation can have deleterious effects on whites.
A number of studies suggest that the election of minorities can have im-
portant consequences for the trust of both minorities and whites. Abney and
Hutcheson (1981) found that the election of a black mayor stabilized attitudes
toward city government at a time in which trust was declining in the coun-
try at-large (but see Bobo and Gilliam Jr, 1990; Pantoja and Segura, 2003;
Overby et al., 2005). And in one of only a handful of studies to look across
levels of government, Pantoja and Segura (2003) find that Latinos report
feeling less alienation when they have more descriptive representation across
levels (although the effects of being descriptively represented do not seem to
be sufficient to completely ameliorate dissatisfaction with government).
In addition to affecting citizens’ attitudes, representation can also have
an effect on political behaviors. Having a representative who shares a con-
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stituent’s racial (or gender) identity seems to boost contact with that rep-
resentative (Gay, 2002; Banducci, Donovan and Karp, 2004; Krook and
Norris, 2009). Several studies have found that descriptive representation
is linked with higher turnout (Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Bobo
and Gilliam Jr, 1990; Whitby, 2007). There are, however, many caveats to
this research. The first is that the size (and even mere presence) of a turnout
effect is inconsistent across studies. The second is that the effect of black
descriptive representation is often conditional, and may be influenced by the
length of tenure of black officials and the percent black in the community
(Spence, McClerking and Brown, 2009; Spence and McClerking, 2010).
Another note of caution from this literature is that enhancing minority
representation can have negative effects for whites. Gay (2001) finds that
increased black descriptive representation corresponds with a decrease in
white political engagement (see also Bobo and Gilliam Jr, 1990; Barreto,
Segura and Woods, 2004). Similarly, Ulbig (2005) finds that high levels of
black descriptive representation actually decreases white trust in the courts.
The explanation for these negative effects for whites is somewhat elusive.
On the one hand, if whites and blacks have similar desires to be descriptively
represented, then any increase in black representation necessarily means a
corresponding decrease in white representation. This would lead us to expect
higher levels of black representation would correspond with lower trust and
engagement for whites.
However, other theories would suggest that whites should be more partic-
ipatory when blacks achieve greater representation. Blumer’s (1958) theory
of group position suggests that as blacks make political gains (or become a
larger proportion of the population), whites’ political power will be threat-
ened (Blalock, 1967). We might expect this threat to act as a mobilizer,
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thereby increasing white political engagement in the same way that leuko-
cytes are mobilized in response to the growing strength of a perceived threat
to the immune system.
2.1.1 Collective effects of representation
The bulk of the studies on the effects of representation have focused on situa-
tions in which a citizen was (or was not) directly represented by a member of
his own racial or ethnic group. This is the classical conception of representa-
tion, and is sometimes referred to as “dyadic” representation. The individual
constituent and elected official form a dyad in which that constituent either
is or is not represented (descriptively, substantively, etc.).
But focusing solely on dyadic representation can be limiting, especially
with respect to members of permanent minority groups. Due to their numer-
ical status, it is unlikely that very many minorities will have dyadic descrip-
tive representation in institutions such as Congress, without some extreme
form of gerrymandering.
The problem is even more clear when we move to other forms of gov-
ernment. Consider the case of local city councils. Most city councils are
numerically small (typically ranging from five to a dozen members). In lo-
calities in which council members are elected from districts, a typical city is
likely to only have a handful of minority council members, if they have any at
all. Unless minorities are extremely concentrated into a single or a handful
of districts, then a great number of local minorities will not be descriptively
represented, even if there are minorities on the city council.
However, there are some localities in which local officials are elected at-
large. In this case, the dyadic link between constituent and official becomes
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murky. In a council of seven members selected at large, how are we to as-
sess the level of descriptive representation received by members of different
groups? Since each constituent can be thought of as having seven direct
representatives on the city council, we cannot simply treat descriptive rep-
resentation as occurring or not. Instead, we need to take into account the
degree of descriptive representation on the council as a whole.
This is similar in spirit to Weissberg (1978)’s conception of collective repre-
sentation. In the Weissberg formulation, even if a constituent’s own member
of Congress does not descriptively or substantively represent him, that does
not mean he receives no representation. Instead, he can be represented by
the body as a whole through the efforts of other elected officials who are not
his dyadic representative.4
Applying this to the case of city councils, we can now think of descriptive
and substantive representation as occurring collectively. In the case of at-
large councils, we can measure the amount of descriptive representation as
the total proportion of the council that shares a particular group’s identity.
So in a town with a 15% black population, a council would be proportionally
representative if 15% (1 out of 7 from the previous example) are black. This
greatly simplifies talking about levels of descriptive representation. And
there is significant research that suggests that collective representation —
especially descriptive representation — can be consequential in many of the
same ways as direct, dyadic representation (Meier and England, 1984; Herrick
and Welch, 1992; Alozie and Manganaro, 1993; Bratton and Ray, 2002; Ulbig,
2005). And in many ways, looking at collective representation can be more
illuminating than looking solely at dyadic representation because it is much
4This has also been referred to as “surrogate representation,” although this term is
somewhat less applicable in the case of local governments that may be at-large rather
than based on geographic districts.
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easier to observe.
Looking at collective representation carries the benefit of being able to
assess the total effect of diversity on legislative outcomes and citizen behav-
iors. Just because a black does not live in a majority-minority district does
not mean that his policy concerns are not being heard, especially if there
are many black representatives in the legislature. This is precisely what was
found by Hero and Tolbert (1995) with the case of Latinos. If we were to
look solely at dyadic representation, our findings would be null. But with
the increase in Latinos in Congress, more legislation pertinent to the Latino
community was, in fact, getting passed. As such, we might miss the big
picture if we focused exclusively on direct representation.5
2.1.2 Limitations of existing studies of representation
This existing body of work on representation does not allow us to fully an-
swer the question of whether and how citizens are willing to make tradeoffs
between aspects of representation, which is crucial for understanding how
best to structure institutions to maximize satisfaction across social groups.
In order to advance our understanding of representation, we should focus on a
few key things. First, we should focus our attention on how citizens respond
to and evaluate aspects of representation. Although behavioral responses
such as voting are important for the health and vibrancy of democracy, our
primary concern on this front is whether or not different aspects of represen-
tation are crucial for citizens’ perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. Second,
we need to be able to isolate each aspect of representation in question. Ex-
isting literature does not allow us to do so, and as such, we are limited in
5Although the authors do caution that it is not clear that indirect, collective represen-
tation is a substitute for direct substantive representation.
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the conclusions we can draw. Finally, the literature needs to investigate seri-
ously the implications of different representational arrangements on different
groups in society.
One of the limitations of traditional studies of representation is their in-
ability to isolate different aspects of representation. The studies discussed
above demonstrate that different aspects of representation can have tangible
consequences for citizens’ attitudes and behavior. Many of these studies fo-
cus on the consequences of descriptive representation, while others focus on
the consequences of substantive or policy representation.
But a point that is identified in this literature is that substantive and
descriptive representation often go hand-in-hand. Consider the following
example. A black constituent has a black representative in Congress. Not
only does the representative share the constituent’s racial identity, she is also
active on issues of importance to her black constituent, such as sponsoring
bills related to civil rights and affirmative action. If we happen to survey
her black constituent and found the constituent to hold high levels of trust
in government, what are we to conclude is the cause of high trust? Is it
because the constituent is descriptively represented? Or because he has a
representative in Congress who is active on issues of importance to him? In
this case, the answer is ambiguous.
In order to adjudicate between the effects of substantive and descriptive
representation, we need to isolate each aspect and observe its consequences.
For the moment, let us consider a simplification where both descriptive and
substantive representation are dichotomous and either do or do not occur
(see Figure 2.1. In order to determine the separate effects of substantive and
descriptive representation in this simplification, we would need to observe
situations in each of the four boxes from Figure 2.1: both substantive and
20
descriptive representation, neither substantive nor descriptive representation,
substantive representation without descriptive representation, and descrip-
tive representation without substantive representation.
This poses no problem in the abstract. But when we observe representation
occurring in the real world, it is unlikely that we will actually observe each
of these conditions independently.
The reason for this is intuitive. A large part of the reason why scholars
and political elites advocate in favor of descriptive representation is because
decision-makers from permanent minority groups tend to behave differently
from their white counterparts. Increased descriptive representation has been
linked to higher substantive representation (Preston, 1978; Owens, 2005).
In addition to affecting substantive representation directly, having minority
legislators tends to increase attention to minority issues and cues (Preuhs and
Hero, 2011; Minta, 2009; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman, 2012), and minority
representation can improve the quality of government services (Marschall and
Ruhil, 2007) and alter the effectiveness and composition of the bureaucracy
(Eisinger, 1982; Davis, Livermore and Lim, 2011). Similar findings have been
demonstrated with the representation of women (Swers, 2005; Celis, 2007).
Minority legislators also tend to have different behaviors in and relationships
with their districts (Fenno, 2003). And,in line with what Mansbridge (1999)
suggests, diversity on decision-making bodies has been shown to alter the
content of deliberations (Mendelberg and Oleske, 2000; Chaney, 2006).
Given these findings, it would be hard to argue that descriptive and sub-
stantive representation tend to be independent of one another in the real
world. Having high levels of descriptive representation tends to also lead to
higher levels of substantive representation, on average. At the very least, the
evidence is clear that minority and white political elites behave differently
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— their behavior and attention to issues tends to be different, even if their
voting record does not.
So returning to our simplification, it is unlikely that we will observe each
of the four conditions when using observational techniques. Consider the
example of blacks and their representatives in Congress. As we know, the vast
majority of blacks identify with the Democratic Party, and tend to be very
liberal (at least on economic issues). As such, blacks’ substantive interests are
best represented by Democratic members of Congress. If we were to conduct
a survey of black voters, we would find many of them residing in districts
represented by white Democrats, some residing in majority-minority districts
represented by black Democrats, and still others living in districts represented
by white Republicans. So we would observe blacks in cells (1), (2), and (3)
from Figure 2.1. But because black political elites are as homogeneous as
black voters, what we would often fail to observe is what happens when
blacks are descriptively represented, but not substantively represented (e.g.,
when their member of Congress is a black Republican). Because of this
limitation, we could determine the effect of substantive representation alone
by comparing cells (1) and (3), and the effect of substantive and descriptive
representation versus a lack of both by comparing cells (2) and (3). But we
would not be able to identify the direct effect of descriptive representation.
In order to disentangle these two related aspects of representation, we
need to move to research designs that allow us to observe each aspect of
representation moving independently. The most direct way of doing so is
employing an experiment in which we directly manipulate substantive and
descriptive representation.6
6This is not entirely unheard of within the literature on representation. Scherer and
Curry (2010) uses an experiment to manipulate the racial composition of the U.S. courts
and finds that greater diversity boosts support for courts among blacks, but decreases it
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2.2 A different approach to studying representation
The most prevalent types of studies of representation have led to results
that are mixed at best. Some studies find support for positive effects of
representation, while others have found those effects to be minimal or con-
ditional. And as discussed above, the majority of these studies are unable
to disentangle the effects of descriptive representation from other aspects of
representation. As such, the conclusions we can draw about the effects of
representation (especially descriptive representation) are quite limited.
I argue that in order to move the literature forward, we must shift our focus
in two important ways. First, we must use experiments that will enable us
to study different aspects of representation in isolation. Second, we should
begin asking what it is that citizens want out of representation. It has been
well established that maximizing descriptive representation can undermine
substantive representation (Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran, 1996). But
we know relatively little about whether citizens put a greater emphasis on
achieving policy outcomes, or on having representatives who look like them
(and, in turn, feeling more incorporated into the political process) (but see
Lublin, 1999; Tate, 2004). I shall deal with each of these in turn, beginning
with the latter.
2.2.1 Citizens and representation
Conspicuously absent from a vast majority of studies of representation is an
in-depth discussion of what it is that citizens want out of representation.
The modal approach has been to take some aspect of representation, be it
substantive, descriptive, or symbolic, and test its effects on behaviors and
among whites.
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attitudes. Comparably rare are studies that seek to determine which aspects
of representation citizens actually find most important.
It might well be the case that increased descriptive (or substantive) rep-
resentation leads citizens to vote or contact their representatives at higher
rates. But we should not take such findings as evidence that citizens actually
value or prioritize descriptive (or substantive) representation. These findings
could result even if citizens were not actually satisfied with the process of
representation or how their democracy operates.
This is a subtle point. I am not suggesting that outcomes such as higher
turnout do not matter. Instead, I simply argue that we should seek to in-
crease descriptive (or substantive) representation not because it increases
turnout, but because it produces government processes more in line with
what citizens would want.
The idea that citizens might have preferences about how government pro-
cesses occur is not ground-breaking. In two related studies, Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse (2001; 2002) find that ordinary citizens are affected not only
by the types of policies being produced by Congress, but also by how those
policies came about. In Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s parlance, citizens have
“process preferences.” In contrast to policy preferences which suggest that
citizens care primarily about the ideological outcomes of policies, policy pref-
erences suggest that citizens also care about the mechanism through which
those policies came about. Because Congress is seen as full of gridlock and
partisan bickering, many citizens are turned off and become dissatisfied with
the process itself. As a result, no number of policy successes would satisfy
citizens who despise the very decision-making process itself. Thus, we should
not expect efforts to boost substantive representation to have any significant
impact on satisfaction with government in general, or Congress in particular.
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We should instead focus on ways to affect the process of decision-making in
these bodies.
Similar ideas have been established with regards to the criminal justice
system. In many works, Tyler has argued that an important consideration
for judicial outcomes is procedural justice.7 Tyler (1988) argues that evalu-
ations of judicial outcomes on the part of citizens is not solely attributable
to the content of the outcome itself. Instead, factors such as the perceived
fairness of the process, the honesty of judicial officials, and the extent to
which representation is available all factor into evaluations of decisions.
Levels of procedural justice in turn affect peoples’ satisfaction with judicial
outcomes and their perceptions of the legitimacy of government (Tyler, 1994).
This can have direct consequences for evaluations of the legitimacy of policing
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2003), and levels of perceived procedural justice can
have important implications for whether communities are willing to acquiesce
to government policies (Tyler and Degoey, 1995; Gibson, 1989).
If we treat the level of descriptive representation as one component of the
decision-making process, then it is clear that we can evaluate representation
within the framework laid out by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse and Tyler. The
diversity of decision-making bodies can be seen as having both a direct and
indirect effect on process preferences or evaluations of procedural justice.
The direct effect is that diversity might be, in and of itself, something
that is desired in the decision-making process. Indeed, studies have shown
that racial composition of decision-making bodies can influence evaluations
of those bodies’ legitimacy (Azzi and Jost, 2006), and Tate (2004) finds that
descriptive representation is indeed a component of representation that is
important to them. The indirect effect is that diversity may affect the oper-
7This literature finds its roots in the work of Thibaut, Walker et al. (1975).
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ation of decision-making bodies, which will in turn affect peoples’ evaluation
of those bodies.
Few studies have dealt directly with the ways in which people might value
one aspect of representation or another. A notable exception is the work
of Tate (2004). In it, Tate argues that blacks differ from other Americans
in how they evaluate their representatives. They want their representatives
to be more than simple voting delegates — they place a higher emphasis on
issues of constituency service and ensuring a fair share of Congressional pork.
Moreover, she finds that blacks do tend to be more knowledgeable when their
representative is black (although they are no more trusting of the institution
of Congress as a whole).
This work sets a firm groundwork on which we can derive notions of how
citizens evaluate representation. Where Tate (2004) falls short is disentan-
gling the effects of descriptive representation from the effects of substantive
representation. Because it relies on a national sample, the National Black
Election Study on which Tate’s work is based cannot investigate all four
boxes in Figure 2.1. Those blacks who were actually descriptively repre-
sented were also almost assuredly substantively represented as well. Since
the overwhelming majority of black voters are Democrats, and a correspond-
ingly high proportion of black legislators are liberal Democrats, then it is
unlikely that there were many (if any) blacks who were descriptively repre-
sented but not substantively represented. In other words, in the real world,
descriptive and substantive representation are often entangled. We need to
not only develop expectations about how citizens, both black and white,
would make tradeoffs between these two aspects of representation, but also
to use a research design that will allow us to investigate each aspect’s inde-
pendent effect and their joint effect. To accomplish this, I lay out the notion
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of representation preferences and then discuss an experimental design that
will facilitate a test of theoretical expectations.
2.2.2 Toward a theory of representation preferences
The idea of ordinary citizens having representation preferences is in accor-
dance with the work that has already been done on citizens’ process prefer-
ences, preferences for procedural justice, and even early work examining the
representational link between citizens and their representatives. Where this
notion of representation preferences differs from early work on representation
such as Miller and Stokes (1963) and Kuklinski (1978) is that early works are
focused primarily on policy representation, i.e., the congruence between rep-
resentatives and their constituents on political policies, whereas this notion
of representation preferences extends beyond the sphere of policy alone. In
line with Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), I argue that citizens have pref-
erences not only about what policy outcomes there are (and how they come
about), but also for how decision-making bodies should be composed.
For the purposes of this study, I will be focusing exclusively on two as-
pects of representation: descriptive and substantive representation. There
are many more dimensions of representation that are important, but none
have been as well studied in the domain of permanent minority groups.
So what expectations should we have with regard to citizens’ preferences
for aspects of representation? What should we expect citizens to prioritize?
Ceteris paribus, we should expect that higher levels of both substantive and
descriptive representation should be preferred to lower levels of either or
both. In other words, more representation is better.
A more challenging question arises when citizens are forced to make trade-
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offs between aspects of representation. All citizens, whether members of the
majority or the minority, often need to make tradeoffs between aspects of
representation. For members of permanent minority groups, the numerical
reality dictates that they will be unlikely to achieve both substantive and de-
scriptive representation, at least not when their interests do not overlap with
those of the majority. Even with institutional interventions, it is necessary to
choose what levels of substantive and descriptive representation are satisfac-
tory. If descriptive representation is the sole desire of members of permanent
minority groups, then we would expect them to support institutional de-
signs where candidates from their identity group could run separately from
majority candidates, which would give members of the minority group ul-
timate say over who represents them. However, such institutional designs
mean that majority representatives would have no incentive to be responsive
to the policy wishes of the minority. Conversely, if substantive representa-
tion is paramount, then members of the minority should seek to create as
many “influence districts” as possible to ensure that the maximum number
of legislators are forced to pay heed to the interests of the minority.
For members of the majority, it would be feasible to have high levels of
both descriptive and substantive representation. In fact, given a first-past-
the-post election system and majority rule policy-making, it is theoretically
possible for the majority to hold all elected offices and dictate every policy.
However, people in general are committed to democratic principles (such as
the argument laid out in Federalist 10 ), and should seek to cede at least some
power to the minority.8 But it is an open question how much of a reduction
8A similar argument has been advanced by Rawls (1971). If citizens are rational and the
future is uncertain, then they should act to improve the welfare of the worst-off individual
(since any individual could theoretically be that worst-off individual). In the context
of representation, the argument would be that members of the majority do not know if
they will be able to maintain their numerical superiority ad infinitum, and so they should
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in substantive or descriptive representation members of the majority will
accept. Given the findings of Gay (2001) and others, there is evidence to
suggest any representational gains made by minorities will have immediate
negative effects on the majority.
From the preceding, we have two main questions. First, what do minorities
want from representation? How do they prioritize substantive and descrip-
tive representation? Second, what are members of the majority willing to
give up? If we are interested in satisfying both groups, and satisfying mi-
norities necessitates that we augment their representation at the expense of
the majority, we need to know what concessions members of the majority are
willing to make.
Given that citizens often need to make some tradeoffs regarding repre-
sentation, how should we conceptualize preferences for different aspects of
representation? One straightforward way to think about representation pref-
erences is to think of them as how citizens prioritize the different aspects of
representation. Although an ordinary person might not have a rank-order of
aspects of representation in his head, we can induce him to make hard choices
between the aspects of representation in order to tease out which aspect(s) is
most important, and which are less so. In other words, I conceive a citizen’s
representation preferences as how he would make tradeoffs between different
aspects of representation, if he were forced to do so.
In order to examine this, we need to force citizens to make tradeoffs be-
tween the forms of representation. We can accomplish this using experiments.
Although we cannot simultaneously observe citizens under multiple different
permutations of representation, we can construct experimental treatments
that investigate different combinations of descriptive and substantive repre-
guarantee at least a modicum of fair representation for minority groups
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sentation, and in differing amounts. And by looking at average evaluations
across these combinations, we can determine how members of the minority
and the majority prioritize each aspect of representation.
2.2.3 Experimental design
For this experiment, I investigate the notion of representation preferences
across two aspects of representation. I vary the level of substantive represen-
tation by manipulating whether the outcome of a decision-making process
favors the majority or the minority. I vary the level of descriptive represen-
tation by describing different combinations of majority and minority group
members on the decision-making body. The levels of descriptive representa-
tion are low, medium, and high, vis-a-vis the minority group.
The treatment itself is delivered via a vignette that describes a local policy
decision. The decision regards where to build a new school in a community,
with a body of citizens deciding between a location in a predominantly white
or a predominantly black neighborhood (see Appendix for wording). The
committee is then described as having 5%, 15%, or 50% black members.
The outcome is either to build the school in the predominantly white or the
predominantly black neighborhood. With respect to the minority group, we
then have the resulting six treatments displayed in Figure 2.2.
Using this experiment and the notion of representation preferences, we can
derive expectations for how members of the majority and the minority would
respond to the two aspects of representation. The first of which, described
above, is that:
Hypothesis 1. All else being equal, citizens of both the majority and minor-
ity will always prefer a combination of both high substantive and descriptive
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representation to any other alternative.
Hypothesis 1 derives from the assumption that citizens are rational, and
that more representative situations will necessarily be preferred to situations
in which citizens must make tradeoffs.
For members of the minority, I pose two related hypotheses regarding how
they will prioritize substantive and descriptive representation. They are:
Hypothesis 2. When descriptive representation is below parity, minorities
will be satisfied with government decisions only if the outcome is favorable.
Hypothesis 3. When descriptive representation is at or near parity, mi-
norities will be satisfied with the government decisions regardless of whether
the outcome is favorable or unfavorable.
In other words, I hypothesize that substantive representation is sufficient,
but not necessary, for satisfying members of the minority. When substan-
tive outcomes are unfavorable, I hypothesize that descriptive representation
is sufficient for satisfying members of the minority. From the combination
of Hypotheses 2 and 3, we can derive how minority group members will
make tradeoffs between descriptive and substantive representation. If both
hypotheses hold, then we can infer that minorities prioritize descriptive rep-
resentation over substantive representation.
For members of the majority, the concerns are somewhat different. Because
members of the majority often have the luxury of high levels of descriptive
representation, I posit that they will be unlikely to be much affected by
a slight reduction in descriptive representation. In addition, the numerical
superiority of being a majority group also brings with it the possibility of
dictating policy outcomes, minimizing the importance of being descriptively
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represented. 9 To wit:
Hypothesis 4. Among members of the majority, satisfaction with govern-
ment decisions will be unaffected by the racial composition of the decision-
making body.
To visualize what these hypotheses would predict in terms of empirical
results, we can think about all the potential empirical outcomes. Figure 2.3
displays the potential independent and joint effects of substantive and de-
scriptive representation that we might find. Sub-figure A would indicate that
neither descriptive nor substantive representation has any effect on evalua-
tions of the fairness of the decision making process. Sub-figure B indicates a
positive effect for descriptive representation, but a minimal effect for substan-
tive representation. Sub-figure C shows the opposite: a strong positive effect
for substantive representation, but no effect for descriptive representation.
Sub-figure D illustrates independent effects of substantive and descriptive
representation. Sub-figures E and F demonstrate tradeoffs between the two
aspects of representation. In E, there is a complementary effect of descriptive
and substantive representation, but substantive representation is prioritized
more highly. Substantive representation is always perceived as fairer than a
lack of substantive representation, but the effects of substantive representa-
tion are enhanced by high descriptive representation. In a sense, this result
would indicate that citizens are unwilling to make tradeoffs between the two
aspects of representation: in order to satisfy citizens, they must have both
substantive and descriptive representation. F, on the other hand, illustrates
a situation in which descriptive representation can compensate for a lack
9It should be noted here that the experimental treatments in this study involve a
minimum of 50% descriptive representation for the majority. I am agnostic as to the
expectations were majority group members to consist of less than 50% of the decision-
making body.
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of substantive representation. When the substantive outcome is unfavor-
able, satisfaction can remain high when there is a high level of descriptive
representation. But when descriptive representation is low, only favorable
substantive outcomes will result in high levels of satisfaction.
With regard to the hypotheses laid out above, Hypotheses 2 and 3 refer to
a situation such as in sub-figure F for the minority group. For the majority
group, Hypothesis 4 predicts a finding similar to that in sub-figure C.
2.3 Innumeracy and representation
A major complication of peoples’ representational preferences is the issue of
innumeracy. Thus far, I have discussed preferences for forms of representation
in the abstract. I have laid out the reasons why descriptive representation
might be particularly salient to members of permanent minority groups. I
have also argued that the amount of descriptive representation necessary
to maximize satisfaction with government may be more than traditionally
thought.
However, all of this hinges on on important point that has been left implicit
thus far: the characteristics of the community in which people live. When we
say that blacks should have representation proportional to their population,
we are basing our judgment of representation on the demographic character-
istics of the community itself. So what is proportional in one community is
not proportional in another. In communities where there are few blacks, we
would expect there to be correspondingly few blacks in decision-making of-
fices. But in communities that have sizeable black populations, there should
be high levels of descriptive representation in government.10
10I have left out here situations in which permanent minority groups are not, in fact,
minorities. There are many cities in the United States in which blacks (or Latinos) are
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It is easy to amend the hypotheses above to take community characteristics
explicitly into account. We could suppose that whites’ and blacks’ preferences
for representation will be based on their relative standings in the community.
However, things are not so simple as they appear. An underlying problem
with gauging people’s expectations and evaluations of representation is the
problem of innumeracy.
Innumeracy is a general term given to peoples’ difficulties comprehending
numbers and mathematical concepts. In the present context, I use innumer-
acy to refer to peoples’ unsteady evaluations of the demographic makeup of
their own community. For example, if a town is 85% white and 15% black,
then we might expect blacks to want something around 15% of elected of-
ficials to be black, and whites to want something around 85% of elected
officials to be white. But what if citizens tend to have inaccurate estimates
of their community’s demographics? What if a black resident believes that
blacks comprise 40% of the community? Would we expect them to be sat-
isfied with 15% descriptive representation? Or would we expect them to
want representation commensurate with what they believe is the size of the
black community? If the latter is true, then it is unlikely that even truly
proportional representation will satisfy citizens.
The problem of innumeracy is not simply hypothetical hand-wringing.
There is a substantial, and growing, literature suggesting that people are
very poor at perceiving their immediate surroundings. Nadeau, Niemi and
Levine (1993), Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz (2005), and Wong (2007) find
that people greatly overestimate the size of minority populations in their own
actually the largest ethnic group. However, examining preferences for representation in
such communities is beyond the scope of this project. In order to do so, one would have
to purposely sample such communities, since they are relatively unlikely to comprise a
meaningful portion of a randomly drawn national population.
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community and in the country at-large. This overestimation is so strong that
many people believe that whites have become a minority of the population.
As a result, we could expect levels of racial threat to be much higher, and, as
Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz finds, this can lead to greater animosity toward
minority groups (see also Wright Jr, 1977; Glaser, 1994).
The potential challenges posed by innumeracy are directly related to Blumer
(1958)’s theory of group position and group threat. According to Blumer, as
minority groups become larger and threaten the dominant group’s superior-
ity, members of the dominant group will respond with higher prejudice and
animosity toward the offending minority group. This has generally been theo-
retically and empirically linked to actual population proportions — countless
studies support the idea that higher group proportions lead to higher racial
animosity (Quillian, 1995).
But there is an indirect effect as well. In order for group size to have an
effect, the size of that group must be perceived. So in the case of whites
and blacks, whites should only negatively react to larger black populations
if they actually perceive that population. If, for whatever reason, a member
of the dominant group does not perceive there to be a substantial minority
population, they should not exhibit any higher racial threat (see Wong et al.,
2012).
The converse is also true. If a member of the dominant group perceives
there to be a growing number of minorities, she should exhibit higher levels
of racial threat. This phenomenon is likely to occur even if the facts do not
support peoples’ perceptions, although Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz (2005)
finds that both have independent effects. In short, as people perceive there to
be more members of racial minorities, they should also exhibit higher levels
of racial threat (but see Wong, 2007)
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This increase in racial threat is likely to come into conflict with people’s
evaluations of representation. On the one hand is group conflict theory which
suggests that as minority group size increases, we would expect members
of the majority to exhibit greater discrimination and animosity toward the
minority group. It is reasonable to extrapolate that members of the majority
who are feeling threatened by a minority group will be less supportive of
increased minority representation. On the other hand, if people hold strong
preferences about political processes, and a component of these preferences
is support for procedural fairness, then higher numbers of minorities should
dictate a corresponding increase in minority representation. So if someone
who is white (mis)perceives the black population to be 40% and he believes
that decision-making bodies should look roughly similar to the communities
they represent, then he should support levels of black representation up to
40%. We might expect this to take place regardless of whether the black
population is actually 40%, or if it is much lower.
This complication of innumeracy creates competing expectations for the
response of whites to minority representation. But it also will affect mi-
norities’ evaluations of their representation in elected bodies. Members of
minority groups are generally no better than whites at estimating how large
their racial group is within their community (or the nation at-large). Wong
(2007) finds that blacks generally estimate their own population percentage
in the U.S. to be around 38%, when it was only around 12% as of the 2000
U.S. Census (see also Tate, 2004). Similarly, the mean percent black in local
communities in Wong (2007)’s study was 22%, yet black respondents thought
their local community was, on average, about 50% black.
As a result of these poor estimates of group size, we would also expect mem-
bers of permanent minority groups to desire greater proportions of elected
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bodies to share their racial identity. It is possible that a desire for greater-
than-proportional representation on the part of permanent minority groups
is, in fact, due to their belief that they make up a greater percent of the
population. So if a black would be most satisfied with a city council that is
50% black and 50% white, the cause could be either that he desires to have
an equal voice at the policymaking table, or it could be that he thinks that
50% is actually proportional to the black population in town.
As a result of this, I posit the following hypothesis regarding innumeracy:
Hypothesis 5. Preferences for descriptive representation of both majority
and minority group group members will be be based on how they perceive their
community’s composition
To think about Hypothesis 5, consider two minority group members from
a community that is 15% black. One believes his group makes up 15% of the
population, the other believes his group makes up 50% of the population. If
we were to compare the two, then a level of descriptive representation of 50%
would be high to the first minority group members, but only proportional to
the perceived population of the second minority group member.
For whites, the expectations are somewhat less clear. One possibility that
perceiving there to be more blacks in the community than blacks’ true num-
bers will lead to an increase in racial threat, and in turn this will lead to a
reduction in support for black representation. The other possibility is that
perceiving there to be more blacks will lead to higher expectations of how
much black representation is fair, and in turn this will lead to an increase in
support for black representation. Without past empirical work to guide us,
it is not clear which expectation we should expect. As such, Chapter 5 will
test between these two possibilities with no a priori hypothesis as to which
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story is correct.
Chapter 5 will explore this issue of innumeracy in depth. In Chapters
3 and 4, I will explore blacks’ and whites’ evaluations of representation
based solely on the level of substantive and descriptive representation in the
experimental treatment. In Chapter 5, I then condition these evaluations
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Figure 2.3: Potential empirical outcomes
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CHAPTER 3
THE INDEPENDENT EFFECTS OF
DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE
REPRESENTATION
In order to investigate the independent effects of descriptive and substan-
tive representation, I employ an experiment that manipulates each aspect
in a local decision-making setting. The decision itself is about whether to
build a new school in a predominantly white or a predominantly black neigh-
borhood. The treatment is administered via a vignette that describes some
background for the decision, the composition of the decision-making body,
and the ultimate outcome of the decision-making process.
The issue of school location was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it
is prima facie non-partisan. Whether to build a school in one neighborhood
or another does not have any inherent partisan or ideological components.
As such, I am avoiding the complication of partisanship.1
Second, the issue of school location also facilitated having outcomes that
favor whites versus blacks. For many other policy outcomes, whether the
outcome is favorable or not is dependent upon a person’s policy preferences.
In this case, the decision itself has substantive implications for whites and
blacks directly; having the school built in a black neighborhood provides a
direct benefit to blacks as a group.
1Given the importance of partisanship to American politics, it might seem odd to select
an issue domain that is non-partisan. But the main focus of the present project is to test
preferences for forms of representation. By (mostly) removing partisanship from the mix,
I can isolate the effects of substantive outcome without having to account for partisan
filters. This issue will be revisited in Chapter 5.
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3.1 Subject recruitment
Subjects were recruited for this experiment using Amazon.com’s “Mechani-
cal Turk” (MTurk). MTurk is an online marketplace where individuals can
complete short tasks for pay. Those needing tasks completed by humans
(a.k.a. a Requester) post a listing for a “Human Intelligence Task” (HIT)
that describes the task and how much workers will be compensated. For
very short HITs, workers might only be paid a few cents. Longer and more
difficult tasks tend to pay more, although the effective hourly rate subjects
are paid may not be higher (due to the higher amount of time needed to
complete the task).
Requesters can set a number of stipulations on who can complete the
task and how long workers have to complete the task. For this experiment,
workers were restricted to those who live in the United States. Location is
determined by the bank account linked to the worker’s profile and not to
where the worker actually completes her work. As a result, it is possible to
have surveys completed from abroad by workers who have a U.S. address
and/or bank account.2
The HIT itself asked workers to “[c]omplete a short survey about politics
and local government.” Workers were then directed to a proprietary survey
website where the present experiment was hosted. Workers were paid $0.40
for their time, and the survey took on average 4 minutes and 18 seconds.3
2This did occur in the present study. 36 workers completed the HIT from IP addresses
not in the United States. 11 of these were IP addresses associated with India, 5 from
the United Kingdom, 4 from Macedonia, 3 from Canada, 2 each from Georgia, Germany,
and Thailand, and 1 each from Australia, Brazil, Israel, Mongolia, Netherlands, Pakistan,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey. These foreign IP addresses were
excluded from the analyses presented below, although their inclusion does not alter the
substantive findings.
3This works out to an average hourly rate of $5.58. This raises a host of ethical
questions for social scientists looking to use MTurk as a recruitment tool. On the one
hand, this effective hourly rate is higher than the majority of HITs on the marketplace.
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Data collection lasted for around five days.
3.1.1 Limitations and advantages
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to using MTurk. The
chief advantages of using MTurk are the speed with which studies can be con-
ducted and the relatively low cost of gathering national samples. The present
study began data collection on a Tuesday and the sample was complete by
Sunday. In addition to taking only five days, MTurk data are available while
the HIT is in the field. So researchers can examine the data before collection
is completed. If a survey instrument appears not to be working, or there
is some other problem with the HIT itself, researchers can pause or cancel
the HIT before it is complete. That same HIT can then be re-posted in the
MTurk marketplace once any problems are corrected.
By far the biggest advantage of using MTurk is the ease and cost with
which researchers can obtain a national sample. For a survey with a target
sample size of 500 and a pay rate of $0.75 per HIT, total costs would be $375
plus fees collected by MTurk (typically 10%). This compares very favorably
with the tens of thousands of dollars it costs to put a similar survey in the
field with a major survey house.
However, MTurk is not without its disadvantages. Two important limi-
tations to note are that the MTurk sample is certainly not a representative
national sample, and there are additional concerns about how close of atten-
At the same time, the rate itself is below the U.S. minimum wage. While this is not as
much of a concern when administering tasks to MTurk workers living outside the U.S. (a
great number of whom live in India where wages are much lower), using a U.S. sample
requires balancing the needs of obtaining an affordable sample and still offering reasonable
compensation for the task. $0.40 was chosen as a target payment amount largely based
upon the research done by Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) that investigated how different
pay rates and completion times related to the speed of data collection
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tion workers are paying to the task itself.4 The former question represents the
biggest challenge to using MTurk data to complete social scientific studies.
A number of studies have begun assessing how representative MTurk sam-
ples are vis-a-vis the general population as sampled by representative sur-
veys, student samples, and local convenience samples. The general consensus
is that MTurk samples are much more demographically diverse than student
samples, and at least as diverse as local convenience samples. Berinsky, Hu-
ber and Lenz (2012) discusses these concerns in depth with specific regard to
MTurk’s political science applications. In that paper, Berinsky, Huber and
Lenz analyzed the demographic composition of student and adult samples
(from the work of Kam, Wilking and Zechmeister (2007) which compared
traditional student samples with local adults), and two adult samples from
different cities (from the work of Berinsky and Kinder (2006)). The au-
thors find that their MTurk samples compared favorably to these other data
sources. The MTurk sample was about as racially diverse as the adult sam-
ples, and about as educated as samples drawn from Ann Arbor, MI and
Princeton, NJ. The MTurk sample was older than the student sample, but
younger than the local convenience samples. Finally, the MTurk data were
4This latter concern can be ameliorated through a number of means. The first is that
each HIT must be accepted or rejected by the requester. So if it appears that a worker
skipped the survey entirely, the requester can reject that particular HIT and that worker
will not get paid for completing it. A second safeguard is to require workers to enter
in a randomly generated code that is only provided once all survey items are complete.
A third approach is to introduce an instrumental manipulation check as described by
Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko (2009). This approach entails giving a reasonably
lengthy body of instructions prior to a question that direct subjects to do something
other than simply answer the question. In Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko’s case,
in the instructions subjects were asked to ignore the question prompt and instead click
on the title of the page to advance to the next question. Subjects who did so passed the
manipulation check, whereas subjects that read the question below and answered it failed
the check. Fourth and finally, traditional manipulation checks can be conducted to ensure
that subjects at least received the intended treatment. The present study included both
a traditional manipulation check and required subjects to complete the entire survey to
receive an authentication code.
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less skewed by party than any of the local convenience samples.
Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) also compare a sample gathered using
MTurk to the political science gold standard, the ANES. Compared to the
ANES, Berinsky, Huber and Lenz’s MTurk sample is slightly more female,
younger, poorer, and more likely to rent rather than own their home. The
proportion of white respondents is nearly identical, although MTurk has
fewer black respondents. The MTurk sample is also comparable to the ANES
sample with regards to geographic coverage of the U.S. (although MTurk does
have slightly more respondents from the Northeast than does the ANES).
From these comparisons, Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) conclude that
MTurk data are somewhat less representative of true national random sam-
ples such as the ANES, but are better than student samples and at least
as good as local samples.5 The appropriateness of MTurk data is of course
dependent upon the intended application. For most political science applica-
tions, MTurk will yield results preferable to a student sample and preferable
to a local sample, depending on the size and diversity of the locality.
3.1.2 Basic demographics
For the present study, MTurk does pose some limitations. MTurk data tend
to be somewhat less racially diverse than the ANES or a local sample drawn
from a diverse community. In particular, there are relatively few blacks in
MTurk samples (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) found about 4.4% black).
As a result, it was necessary to collect a larger than usual sample size in
order to ensure that there would be enough black subjects to investigate
5This conclusion is echoed by Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling (2011) with regard to
the use of MTurk for psychological experiments.
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their preferences for representation.6 For this reason, a total of 1200 HITs
were completed by MTurk workers.
The basic demographic characteristics of this MTurk sample are displayed
in column 2 of Table 3.1 and compared to the 2008 ANES. Overall, the
match between my MTurk sample and a nationally representative sample is
fairly good.7 The MTurk sample is more male and younger. In addition,
the proportion of the sample that is black is much lower than in the ANES.
Finally, the MTurk sample is slightly more Democratic than is the ANES
sample.
Table 3.1: Demographic comparison of MTurk and ANES
Demographics MTurk ANES (2008) Reduced MTurk
Female 42% 55% 44%
Age 31 47 32
Race
White 78% 79% 92%
Black 7% 12% 8%
Latino 6% 9% 0%
Party ID
Democrat 44% 42% 42%
Republican 39% 19% 40%
Mean Party ID 2.1 2.3 2.1
Total N 1155 2322 961
For the present project, I am only interested in the representation prefer-
ences of blacks and whites. Eliminating Latinos, Asian Americans, and other
racial and ethnic groups from the sample decreases the total N to 961 (79 of
whom are black) and results in the demographics presented in column 4 of
Table 3.1. Eliminating Latinos and Asian Americans from the sample makes
6In addition to collecting a larger than typical sample to get higher numbers of black
respondents, a nationally representative survey is also currently being fielded by the Co-
operative Campaign Analysis Project that replicates the present findings.
7In fact, this match is much closer than that reported in Berinsky, Huber and Lenz
(2012).
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the resulting sample slightly more female, slightly older, and less Democratic.
3.2 Treatment vignette and variables
One caveat that bears mentioning here is the construction of the substantive
representation manipulation. In the literature on representation, substantive
representation is almost always linked to whether a policy outcome is in
line with a person’s policy preferences. This tradition dates back to the
classic studies of representation such as Miller and Stokes (1963). However,
in this case I am not actually measuring subject’s preferences for the policy
in question. At no point in time do I ask subjects to weigh in on whether
they believe the new school should be built in the predominantly white or
predominantly black neighborhood.
Instead, I assume that group interest is a reasonable proxy for substantive
interests. In other words, when the outcome favors blacks as a whole (by
rebuilding the school in a neighborhood dominated by blacks), I assume
that black subjects will be more substantively represented than when the
outcome favored whites. This assumption seems warranted, at least in the
case of blacks. Work by Dawson (1995) laid the groundwork for the theory
of linked fate. The theory of linked fate argues that when evaluating policies,
blacks will be influenced more by how the policy affects their racial group as
a whole than they will by how the policy affects them personally.8
For this reason, we should expect that locating the school in the black
neighborhood should correspond with what the preferences of blacks would
be, were we to measure them. I make this assumption for whites as well,
although whether or not this assumption holds is not clear. It might be the
8Empirical support for this theory has been found across several issue domains (see
Kinder and Winter, 2001; Gay, 2004)
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case that whites who are conscious to past discriminatory decisions regarding
the provision of public goods to black neighborhoods might favor improving
schools in black neighborhoods as a matter of policy. If this is the case, it
would dilute any experimental effects of substantive representation on whites.
3.2.1 Vignettes
The vignette employed in this experiment read:
Suppose your communitys local government has appointed a com-
mittee consisting of 20 registered voters from the community. The
purpose of the committee is to recommend the location of a new
school, which will replace an existing school. Chances are high
that this is the last new school your community will be able to
build in a long time.
The committee identified two equally deserving locations. Each of
the locations badly needs a new school. They differ in that one of
the locations is in a predominantly white neighborhood, the other
location in a predominantly African-American neighborhood.
This committee consisting of [18/15/10] white members and [2/5/10]
black members has been holding hearings through the community
and just announced its decision: the new school will replace the
old school in the [white/African-American] neighborhood.
Subjects were randomly assigned to have 2, 5, or 10 black members of the
committee, and the substantive outcome was randomly assigned to either the
white or the black neighborhood. The results of this randomization can be
seen in Figure 3.1.
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N=145 N=185 N=148
Favored whites
Treatment 4 Treatment 5 Treatment 6
N=167 N=170 N=146
3.2.2 Variables
I use only limited covariate adjustment in the models described below.9 Three
variables are of importance here. The first is party identification. This is mea-
sured on a 7-point scale and rescaled to run from 0 to 1 (0 = strong Democrat,
1 = strong Republican). Although the decision-making process described in
the treatment vignettes is ostensibly non-partisan, the pervasiveness of party
may still influence whether people support improving predominantly white
or predominantly black neighborhoods.
On a related note, a 5-point scale of ideology is also included as a control
variable. This is included for two reasons. The first is identical to the logic
laid out above. The second is that studies have shown ideological differences
in people’s process preferences (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). If liberals
and conservative differ in their ideal decision-making process, then they could
also differ in how they respond to varying levels of descriptive and substantive
representation.
Finally, gender is also included as a control variable. This operates under
the theory that men and women might differ in their approaches to decision-
9There is continuing debate over the merits of covariate adjustment in the analysis
of experimental results. I take the advice of Senn (1994), who cautions against intro-
ducing covariates to adjust for imbalance, and recommends only including covariates of
substantive interest (an analysis of balance across treatment conditions can be found in
the Appendix). Others argue vehemently against using covariates at all (Freedman, 2008),
although such arguments may be overly conservative (see Green, 2009). If I run the ex-
perimental analyses including only treatment condition and race, which is central to my
substantive story, the results remain essentially unchanged.
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making. For example, it could be the case that women tend to prefer rep-
resentation that is more consensual, where all groups have an equal voice at
the table (c.f., Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker, 2012). If this is the case,
then some of the heterogeneity in response to treatment could be due to the
respondent’s gender.
Three key outcome variables were used in the experiment.10 Each vari-
able captures a slightly different component of evaluations of representation
(although the results suggest that they behave very similarly). Each out-
come variable was a Likert-scale measuring fairness or satisfaction. The first
asked subjects if they thought the “decision-making was unbiased and fair
to the whole community.” The second asked if the “process used to make
the decision was fair.” The final outcome measure asked specifically about
descriptive representation, and asked subjects how satisfied they would be
with a committee with that racial composition in their own community.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Effects of descriptive representation
The results for each of the three key outcome measures are displayed in Ta-
ble 3.2 below. Regardless of the outcome measure chosen, the basic relation-
ship between descriptive representation and perceptions of fairness remains
the same. Of the three covariates included (gender, party identification, and
ideology), only ideology has any effect on perceptions of fairness. For de-
scriptive representation, the excluded category is high black representation
10Two other outcome measures were also collected that asked about the fairness of the
decision-making process to blacks and whites, respectively. These were included primarily
as checks to make sure that the treatment vignettes had face validity with regards to their
effect on fairness perceptions.
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(50% of decision-makers were black). Coefficient estimates are the result of
an OLS linear regression.11
Table 3.2: Independent effects of descriptive representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.63 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.61 0.02
Low Descriptive -0.10 0.02 -0.17 0.02 -0.11 0.02
Med Descriptive -0.09 0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Black -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.06
Black*Low Descriptive -0.14 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.08
Black*Med Descriptive 0.05 0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08
Female -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
PartyID -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.04
Ideology 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
The first column of Table 3.2 shows the effect of the descriptive repre-
sentation treatment on subjects’ evaluations of how fair the decision-making
process was to all members of the community. Both low and medium levels
of black descriptive representation are associated with lower perceptions of
fairness for both blacks and whites. Perceptions of fairness to the community
are generally similar when black descriptive representation is low or medium,
and substantially higher when black descriptive representation is high. This
indicates that for both members of the majority and the minority, high levels
of minority representation are important for perceptions of representational
fairness.
Interestingly, blacks do not in general hold more negative evaluations of
the fairness of the process. In addition, there is not a consistent interaction
between race and treatment conditions, which indicates that both whites and
blacks tend to respond to treatment in a similar way. However, blacks who
received the low descriptive representation condition do appear to be more
11The results are identical when an ordered logistic regression is used. OLS results are
presented solely for the ease of interpretation.
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cynical about the fairness of the process than their white counterparts given
the same treatment. On a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest perception
of fairness, whites in the lowest descriptive representation condition have
a mean fairness perception of 0.53, compared to 0.34 for similarly treated
blacks.
Figure 3.2 displays this relationship visually. The dashed line represents
how fairness to the whole community was perceived by whites; the solid line
represents how fairness to the whole community was perceived by blacks. All
other variables are held at their median value. Across all three treatment con-
ditions, whites tend to have somewhat higher perceptions of fairness. How-
ever, this difference is almost nonexistent under the medium representation
condition, and very small (about 0.05) in the high descriptive representation
condition.
The second set of results from Table 3.2 shows the effect of descriptive
representation on perceived fairness of the decision-making process itself. In-
stead of referencing the outcome from the vignette, this dependent variable
is explicitly concerned with whether the process used to arrive at the deci-
sion was fair. For this reason, we should see representational (and process)
preferences coming into play far more than a measure that includes, at least
to some extent, whether or not the outcome was perceived as fair.
As Table 3.2 shows, the effect of descriptive representation on satisfaction
with the process is even stronger than its effect on perceptions of fairness to
the community. As with the earlier dependent variable, both the low and
medium levels of black descriptive representation result in lower evaluations
of the fairness. But for both of these groups, the size of the experimental
effect is stronger than with perceptions of fairness toward the community.



































Figure 3.2: Perceived fairness to the whole community
lower perceptions of fairness, regardless of treatment category (see Figure 3.3).
At low levels of descriptive representation, blacks are about 0.15 points lower
in perceived fairness than are whites. This gap is about 0.13 at mid levels
of descriptive representation, and about 0.05 at high levels of descriptive
representation.
The third and final set of results from Table 3.2 displays the effect of de-
scriptive representation on how satisfied subjects were with the racial com-
position of the decision-making body. Unlike the previous two dependent








































Figure 3.3: Perceived fairness of the decision-making process
body, this dependent variable cues subjects to think about issues of descrip-
tive representation when reporting their satisfaction.
Just as with measures tapping subjects’ evaluations of the fairness of the
decision-making to all members of the community and the fairness of the
process itself, levels of descriptive representation have strong direct effects
on both whites’ and blacks’ levels of satisfaction. As Figure 3.4 shows, At low
levels of descriptive representation, satisfaction with the composition of the
decision-making body was about 0.51 and 0.33 for whites and blacks, respec-
tively. Higher levels of descriptive representation increased satisfaction with
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the body monotonically such that at high levels of descriptive representation








































Figure 3.4: Satisfaction with the committee composition
Overall, these findings point to a strong direct effect of descriptive rep-
resentation. Across all three dependent variables, descriptive representation
yielded higher evaluations of the fairness of the process, the fairness of the
decision-making to all members of the community, and increased satisfaction
with the racial composition of the committee.
These findings corroborate the longstanding argument in the literature on
race and politics that descriptive representation is consequential. From these
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experimental results, we should indeed expect higher evaluations of govern-
ment decision-making as descriptive representation increases. Moreover, this
boost to satisfaction and evaluations of fairness does not just affect minor-
ity group members. Members of the majority also appear to benefit from
higher levels of descriptive representation. This raises interesting questions
for why we tend to see lower political engagement among whites who are
represented by a minority. However, satisfaction and perceptions of fair-
ness do not necessarily equate to behavioral differences, such as increased
turnout or knowledge. Further research is needed to determine whether the
effects found in this experiment might translate into positive (or negative)
behavioral changes.
One curious result of these findings is the overall level of satisfaction ex-
pressed by blacks. For the final dependent variable, satisfaction with the
racial composition of the committee, under no treatment condition did blacks
express overall satisfaction. The highest level of black satisfaction, under the
condition where blacks were 50% of the committee, was 0.49 — slightly lower
than the halfway mark of 0.5. So for this dependent variable, under no cir-
cumstances are blacks on balance more satisfied than they are dissatisfied
with the composition of the committee.
In a similar vein, blacks were only above the halfway mark on perceived
fairness of the decision-making process when descriptive representation was
50%. When descriptive representation was 15% or lower, blacks were on bal-
ance dissatisfied with the decision-making process. Evaluations of fairness to
the whole community fared somewhat better. So long as descriptive repre-
sentation was not the lowest category, blacks were on balance satisfied with
the process. However, in all circumstances black satisfaction seems to lag
behind that of whites.
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This raises an interesting dilemma about trying to increase blacks’ satis-
faction with government processes. Reaching the high levels of descriptive
representation necessary to push blacks above 50% satisfaction might be
impossible in the real world. It might require representational parity to ac-
complish this feat (if we focus on the results of the third dependent variable),
which would require drastic changes to the composition of decision-making
bodies, from Congress down to City Hall. Even with the most optimistic
dependent variable, black satisfaction with decision-making process is only
barely above 50% when the composition is roughly proportional to blacks’
numerical status in the nation at-large. Thus, assumptions that we should
push for proportional descriptive representation (from sources as diverse as
Guinier (1995) and Mansbridge (1999)) might not accomplish much in terms
of boosting satisfaction with government.
This still leaves us with two important questions. First, why is it that
blacks tend to perceive the process as less fair, regardless of the racial com-
position of the decision-making body? Second, and perhaps more interesting,
why is it that the levels of descriptive representation needed to satisfy blacks
seems so high? Why might proportional representation be enough to boost
black satisfaction to levels near that of whites? I explore this latter question
is greater detail in Chapter 5.
3.3.2 Effects of substantive representation
The results for descriptive representation indicate that both whites and
blacks are indeed responsive to the effects of differing levels of that aspect
of representation. But what role does the actual substantive outcome of
decision-making have on perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with the
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decision-making process? Do we see the same persistent deficit in satisfaction
for blacks in comparison to whites? Or do favorable substantive outcomes
trump the lower perceptions that seem endemic to blacks in this experiment?
The effects of substantive representation are summarized in Table 3.3.
Each column corresponds with one of the three dependent variables employed
in the experiment. As with descriptive representation, the direct effect of the
experimental manipulation is consistent and in the expected direction.
Both blacks and whites rated the decision more negatively when the out-
come favored whites than when it favored blacks. This effect is roughly the
same size across all three dependent variables. In addition, blacks reacted
more negatively to outcomes favoring whites. The size of this interaction
between race and treatment condition varied across the three dependent
variables, but the difference is statistically different from zero in all three
cases.
3.3.3 Satisfaction and substantive representation
Table 3.3: Independent effects of substantive representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.59 0.02 0.60 0.02 0.57 0.02
Favored Whites -0.07 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.02
Black 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.05
Black*Favored Whites -0.19 0.06 -0.13 0.06 -0.24 0.07
Female 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02
PartyID -0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 0.04
Ideology 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
To get a sense of racial differences in response to treatment, Figure 3.5
shows the effect of treatment on evaluations of fairness of the decision to all
members of the community. When the outcome favored whites, whites were
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only slightly favorable in their ratings, on balance (0.53 on the 0 to 1 scale).
blacks, on the other hand, expressed very negative evaluations of the decision
when it favored whites. The predicted rating of fairness for a black where
the substantive outcome was unfavorable is only 0.37 (when all else is held
at its median value).
This represents a high level of dissatisfaction with the decision-making
process, and also a substantial gap between the perceptions of whites and
blacks. This is not altogether unsurprising; when outcomes do not favor one’s
preferred policy, we can only expect satisfaction to go down.
What is interesting is that when the substantive outcome favored blacks,
white and black subjects were virtually identical in their evaluations of the
fairness of the decision to the whole community (0.60 and 0.62 for whites
and blacks respectively). If the only thing in operation were simple group
interest, then we should expect whites in the “Favored blacks” treatment to
appear similar to blacks in the “Favored whites” treatment. But this is simply
not the case. Both whites and blacks express relatively high perceptions of
fairness when the outcome favors blacks. If anything, white perceptions of
fairness are higher when the outcome favors blacks over whites.
If we turn to either of the other two dependent variables, we see much the
same story. Figure 3.6 shows predicted outcome by race for perceptions of
fairness of the process, and Figure 3.7 shows the predicted outcome by race
for satisfaction with the group composition.
In both of these cases, like in the case of fairness to all members of the
community, the evaluations of blacks are much lower when the substantive
outcome favors whites. This is in keeping with the argument of linked fate
— when the outcome is unfavorable to blacks in general, individual blacks


































Figure 3.5: Perceived fairness to the whole community
effect on them).
However, when the outcome favors blacks, both whites and blacks express
more positive evaluations of the decision-making body and process. In both
cases, having an outcome that favored their racial in-group led blacks to hold
opinions as favorable as whites’. And in both of these cases, going from an
unfavorable to a favorable outcome improved blacks’ ratings of the decision-
making from dismal (0.37 for fairness of the process, 0.29 for satisfaction
with the composition) to generally positive (0.59 for fairness of the process







































Figure 3.6: Perceived fairness of the decision-making process
As with the first dependent variable, whites’ evaluations of the process
do not degrade when that process favors blacks. Instead, there is a slight
improvement in evaluations when the process favors blacks. This could be
due in part to the low saliency of the in-group to white subjects. The result
is exactly what we would expect if whites’ policy attitudes are unaffected by
whether the policy is beneficial for whites in general or not.
In addition, this could help explain the positive effect for ideology. As
reported in Table 3.3, conservatives tend to be more positive toward the







































Figure 3.7: Satisfaction with the committee composition
an interaction term between ideology and treatment condition, we find a
strong positive direct effect of treatment such that whites are, on average,
more positive when the outcome favors blacks. However, this relationship is
attenuated for conservatives.12
12See Appendix for full results.
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3.4 Representation and maximizing satisfaction across
groups
The results above paint a remarkably rosy picture of how we might go about
increasing satisfaction with government outcomes for both the majority and
the minority. For both groups, higher levels of descriptive representation
of blacks actually increased satisfaction. This suggests that, at least under
the conditions described in the experiment, members of the majority are
willing to cede substantial amounts of their own descriptive representation
to members of the minority.
This should be taken as encouraging to those who seek to boost minority
descriptive representation in governance. An empirical concern first raised
by Gay (2001) has been that boosting minority descriptive representation
will have deleterious effects on members of the majority. If the results of this
experiment are to be believed, this is not necessarily the case.
However, caution should be used when trying to draw inferences from the
representation described in this experiment to representation more generally.
The decision process used in the experiment focused on a (at least nomi-
nally) nonpartisan issue — school placement. It is difficult to say how the
effects found here might differ if the decision were more overtly partisan. For
example, we might not expect all whites to be equally accommodating if the
decision was about redistributive policies or affirmative action.
In addition to being nominally nonpartisan, this experiment also seems
to have described a situation in which there is something of a consensus
on what the “right” policy decision should have been. For both blacks and
whites, an outcome favoring blacks appears to be the preferred policy. This
outcome receives significantly higher ratings from blacks, and although the
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difference is small, this outcome receives slightly higher ratings from whites.
This suggests that among both groups (or at least among a substantial subset
of both groups), the fairest policy outcome was one that favored blacks.
As has already been stated, the primary dilemma with regards to minority
substantive representation arises whenever minority and majority interests
are in opposition. The vignettes used in the present experiment do not
seem to capture such a situation. As a result, it is unclear how far we
can generalize the results of this experiment to situations involving more





4.1 The need for tradeoffs
Chapter 3 demonstrated that descriptive and substantive representation had
direct effects of the perceived fairness of decision-making processes and sat-
isfaction with government. Blacks who were in the high descriptive repre-
sentation condition exhibited the highest ratings of fairness and satisfaction.
Blacks who were in the favors blacks substantive condition also exhibited
higher ratings of fairness and satisfaction.
But as was pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2, members of permanent mi-
nority groups often do not have the luxury of having both high descriptive
representation and favorable substantive outcomes. Instead, they are often
forced to make tradeoffs between the two aspects of representation. High lev-
els of descriptive representation are certainly possible, especially via creative
redistricting. However, as Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran (1996) points
out, this may actually decrease their substantive representation.
For that reason, it is important to know whether blacks are willing to
trade off one aspect of representation for another when directly confronted
with such a choice. Can high descriptive representation compensate for fail-
ing to obtain favorable policy outcomes? Or does receiving one’s preferred
policy render other forms of representation moot? Or, most challenging, does
satisfaction require some combination of both high descriptive representation
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and favorable substantive outcomes?
It is also important to know how whites would respond to these com-
binations of descriptive and substantive representation. If high descriptive
representation does compensate for low substantive representation for blacks,
are whites willing to accept this higher level of black descriptive representa-
tion? Or does any increase in black representation trigger negative reactions
from whites?
4.2 Are minority group members willing to make
tradeoffs
To get a first look at whether minority group members are willing to make
tradeoffs between aspects of representation (and whether whites are willing
to accept these combinations), we can compare the mean levels of perceived
fairness and satisfaction across the three dependent variables. Figures 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 below display those mean levels. The solid line approximates
the relationship between descriptive representation and blacks’ perceived fair-
ness/satisfaction when the substantive outcome favors blacks. The dashed
line approximates the relationship between descriptive representation and
blacks’ perceived fairness/satisfaction when the outcome favors whites. Each
point represents the group mean for that treatment condition. The bars are
the 90% confidence interval for the group mean, as determined by a t-test.1
The hypothesis for these dependent variables is stated in Hypotheses 2 and
3. The expectation from these hypotheses is that we should see a gap between
the lines when descriptive representation is low, and no gap when descriptive
1These results were verified using bootstrapped confidence intervals. However, due to
the sparseness of data on black subjects (there are fewer than 10 black subjects in some


































Figure 4.1: Fairness to whole community, black subjects
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representation is high. This would indicate that high levels of descriptive
representation can offset blacks’ dissatisfaction when the substantive outcome
is unfavorable.
Figure 4.1 shows these group means for the first dependent variable, per-
ceived fairness of the decision-making to the whole community. The story
told by the group means is exactly what the hypotheses suggest: when de-
scriptive representation is low, the average perceived fairness to the whole
community is largely dependent on whether the outcome is favorable or un-
favorable to blacks. When it is unfavorable, the average rating was less than
0.30. But when the outcome is favorable, average ratings are statistically
significantly higher (near 0.60).
When descriptive representation is medium, evaluations of fairness increase
for both substantive outcomes. However, this increase is small, and the
90% confidence interval for each group mean includes the group means when
descriptive representation is low. More importantly, though, the fairness gap
between outcomes favoring blacks and favoring whites remains essentially
unchanged.
A very different picture emerges when descriptive representation is high
(i.e., at parity). At the highest level of descriptive representation, there is
very little difference in perceived fairness between outcomes that favor whites
and favor blacks. Outcomes that favor whites yield mean fairness perceptions
of 0.56, and outcomes that favor blacks yield mean fairness perceptions of
0.65 (the mean for outcomes that favor blacks is within the 90% confidence
interval for outcomes that favor whites).
Moreover, when descriptive representation reaches this high level, African
Americans’ average perception of fairness is above 50%, regardless of sub-


































Figure 4.2: Fairness of the process, black subjects
evaluation of the decision-making process when there is parity in descrip-
tive representation. At this high level of descriptive representation, it seems
to matter little whether the outcome is favorable or not. In terms of de-
signing institutions to maximize satisfaction, this suggests that ensuring a
high amount of descriptive representation might succeed without having to
compromise the policy preferences of the majority. This is in line with the
expectations of Hypotheses 2 and 3.
There is a similar, but less clear picture with regard to the second depen-































Figure 4.3: Satisfaction with the composition, black subjects
process itself, high levels of descriptive representation are linked with higher
evaluations, regardless of the substantive outcome. In addition, the gap be-
tween fairness evaluations when the outcome favors whites versus blacks is
smaller when descriptive representation is high than when descriptive repre-
sentation is low or medium (0.11 for high versus 0.27 for low and 0.19 for
medium). But in this case, the mean evaluations of fairness between sub-
stantive outcomes are not significantly different at any level of descriptive
representation.
The story that emerges with the third dependent variable is consistent
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with the findings for the first two dependent variables. As in the case of per-
ceived fairness to the whole community, descriptive representation seems to
compensate for a lack of substantive representation. Although there remains
a satisfaction gap between outcomes that favor whites and outcomes that
favor blacks even when descriptive representation is at its highest level, the
size of that gap is smaller than at lower levels of descriptive representation.
4.2.1 Are majority group members willing to make tradeoffs
Whether or not minorities are willing to make tradeoffs between aspects
of representation could be a moot point. Members of the majority might
tend to reject any increase in the substantive or descriptive representation
of minorities, especially when that descriptive representation is far higher
than their population proportion. If that is the case, then it is unlikely that
any policy interventions aimed at boosting minority turnout would succeed.
Even were such an intervention to be successfully employed, members of the
majority might react negatively to such an effort, perhaps by disengaging
from politics or losing trust in government (Gay, 2001; Ulbig, 2005).
But the results from Chapter 3 suggest that this might not be the case.
All of the direct effects of increasing black representation had positive or null
effects on whites’ evaluations of the fairness to the entire community, fairness
of the process, and satisfaction with the committee composition.
It is thus worth examining the mean evaluations of fairness/satisfaction
in each of the three outcome measures for whites. The results of each of
these group means is presented in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. In addition
to having positive independent effects on evaluations of fairness, the joint

































Figure 4.4: Fairness to the whole community, white subjects
well.
For evaluations of fairness to the whole community, substantive outcomes
that favor blacks are perceived as more fair than substantive outcomes that
favor whites. However, when descriptive representation is at its highest level,
the difference in fairness perceptions across substantive outcomes is negligi-
ble. Interesting is that there is seemingly no effect of going from low to
medium descriptive representation for whites; in both cases fairness remains



































Figure 4.5: Fairness of the process, white subjects
The story is almost exactly the same with regards to perceptions of the
fairness of the process itself. When the outcome reached favored blacks,
perceptions of process fairness were higher at all levels of descriptive repre-
sentation. But when descriptive representation was at its highest level, this
difference was negligible.
Whites’ satisfaction with the composition of the committee was affected
in a similar way as their perceptions of fairness. Unlike fairness perceptions,
however, the effect of substantive outcome mattered very little for whites.































Figure 4.6: Satisfaction with the composition, white subjects
sition when the outcome favored blacks, this difference was extremely small.
But as in the case of the previous two outcome measures, when descriptive
representation is high, whites are essentially indifferent between substantive
outcomes.
4.3 Multivariate analyses
Because the story appears so similar between whites and blacks, I include
both groups for the multivariate analyses presented below. To determine
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Table 4.1: Interactions between descriptive and substantive representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
Intercept 0.63 0.02 0.68 0.03 0.62 0.03
Low descriptive -0.06 0.03 -0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.03
Med Descriptive -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.03
Favors whites -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03
Low*Favors whites -0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.04
Med*Favors whites -0.09 0.04 -0.13 0.04 -0.04 0.04
Black -0.07 0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.12 0.03
Female -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02
Ideology 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
PartyID -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.04
if citizens are willing to make tradeoffs between aspects of representation,
we can interact the two aspects of representation. The expectation from
Hypotheses 2 and 3, and the relationship displayed when looking simply
at group means, is that descriptive representation should compensate for
substantive outcomes that favor whites. That is, we should expect to see
more positive values as descriptive representation increases, and that this
positive effect will overpower any negative effect of substantive outcome.
The results of an interaction model between descriptive and substantive
representation are displayed in Table 4.1. The main effects of each treatment
condition are consistent with the group-based means across all three outcome
variables. For descriptive representation, having low or medium levels of
representation is associated with lower perceptions of fairness and satisfaction
with the composition. Substantive outcomes that favor whites are associated
with lower ratings of fairness and satisfaction.
The interactions between having low or medium descriptive representation
and an outcome that favors whites are negative as well. This suggests that
when outcomes favor whites or there are fewer blacks on the decision-making
body, the representation is seen as less fair and less satisfactory. When the
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outcome favors whites and there are fewer blacks on the decision-making
body, this negative effect is compounded.
Two other direct effects warrant mentioning. In this model, blacks tend
to report lower satisfaction and perceived fairness across all treatment con-
ditions. This is somewhat troubling, but not inconsistent with what the
literature would lead us to believe (see Aberbach and Walker, 1970; Schu-
man and Gruenberg, 1972; DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons, 1990). In addition,
there is a consistent positive, albeit small, effect for ideology such that con-
servatives tend to have higher ratings of fairness and satisfaction across all
treatment conditions.
Because interpreting interaction terms quickly becomes difficult, Figures 4.7,
4.8 and 4.9 display predicted levels of fairness and satisfaction given treat-
ment condition, with all other values held at their median. Note that these
figures represent estimates drawn from the entire sample, including both
blacks and whites. Because whites are the modal category, fitted values for
whites are displayed.2
4.4 Implications for representation
What are we to make of these analyses? The results for blacks support
Hypotheses 2 and 3. But the results for whites are unexpected. Whites
actually appear to be positively affected by high levels of black descriptive
representation, which was not anticipated by Hypothesis 4.
2The fitted values for blacks from this model would be identical to whites’, except
shifted downward by 0.07, 0.11, and 0.12 for each of the three outcome measures. We
could also fit a model where we interact race with treatment conditions. However, this
model did not yield a significant interaction between race and treatment condition. This
is what we would expect given the group-mean results. Although their baseline levels of
satisfaction and perceived fairness differ, the effect of treatment appears to be the same
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l Outcome favors blacks
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Figure 4.9: Satisfaction with the composition by substantive and
descriptive representation
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As has been discussed before, one limitation of this research design is that
there appears to be substantial consensus on which substantive outcome was
more fair. This is likely not to be the case in a number of issue domains. So
we should use caution in interpreting the effects of substantive representation.
But the effects of descriptive representation could not be clearer. For both
whites and blacks, high levels of descriptive representation seem to nullify any
negative effect introduced by a substantive outcome. In other words, when
descriptive representation is high, blacks and whites are willing to view the
representational process as fair, even if the decision did not go their way.3
4.5 Tradeoffs and the prospect for maximizing
satisfaction across groups
These results indicate that minorities are indeed willing to make tradeoffs
about representation. Although the highest ratings of fairness and satisfac-
tion were obtained when there was a combination of substantive and descrip-
tive representation (as expected by Hypothesis 1), descriptive representation
did seem to have a compensatory effect. When descriptive representation is
high, blacks appear nearly indifferent to substantive outcome.
What this suggests is that having a voice may be very important for evalu-
ations of fairness, satisfaction, and legitimacy. Simply providing blacks with
an equal voice at the table appears to nullify any effects of losing a policy
fight. Blacks maintained high ratings of fairness and satisfaction even when
it was decided to build the school in the white neighborhood, so long as black
3An interesting point here is what would constitute substantive representation for
whites. A decision that favors the white neighborhood would appear prima facie to be
the substantively favorable outcome for whites. However, their higher ratings for decisions
favoring the black neighborhood might indicate that this may not be the case. I will return
to this point in Chapter 6.
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representation was on par with white.
Even more interesting are the ratings of whites in these situations. Whites
seem perfectly willing to accept high levels of black descriptive representation
(regardless of substantive outcome). As a result, designers of institutions
might be able to garner support from the minority for policies designed to
boost minority descriptive representation.
In this way, institutions might be able to increase satisfaction with gov-
ernment without treading on principles of majority rule. If having an equal
voice at the decision-making process is sufficient to guarantee high levels of
perceived fairness and satisfaction on the part of minorities, then institutions
that allow for greater minority participation might be effective at boosting
satisfaction. Even if this increased participation was not linked to direct
policy outputs (as might be the case in citizen juries or other deliberative
bodies), we might still see a boost to satisfaction among members of a group




PERCEPTIONS OF RACE AND
REPRESENTATION: THE PROBLEM OF
INNUMERACY
Thus far, the experiment has shown strong support for the premise that
citizens have representation preferences, and that they are willing to make
tradeoffs between descriptive and substantive representation. However, these
results have raised a few important questions, and there is a hitherto unstated
complication of the experimental treatment itself.
One of the questions raised by the results reported in Chapters 3 and
4 is this: How much descriptive representation is sufficient for blacks to
be satisfied with decision-making, regardless of the outcome? From the re-
sults presented in Chapter 4, it would appear that the level of descriptive
representation needed is extremely high. When levels of collective descrip-
tive representation are proportional to the national population (15% in the
experiment, 13% in the national population), blacks’ satisfaction and eval-
uations of fairness are dependent upon the substantive outcome; when the
outcome favors whites, blacks tend to be dissatisfied and view the process
as unfair. We might therefore conclude that even when representation is
proportional, blacks’ representation preference is still for substantive over
descriptive representation. This raises doubts about calls for boosting de-
scriptive representation to levels commensurate with population proportions
(such as Mansbridge, 1999; Guinier, 1995).
But the question is why is the threshold for descriptive representation so
high? Why do blacks (and to a lesser extent, whites) desire there to be
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roughly equal numbers of blacks and whites in decision-making bodies, when
the two racial groups are not close to parity in terms of total population? It
could be that citizens actually want all interested groups to have an equal
say in decision-making. But this raises serious questions about the ability
of normal government bodies to satisfy the representation preferences of or-
dinary citizens. If we must give all stake holders equal voice on decisions,
then we would need to (1) identify who the relevant stake holders are, and
(2) create ad-hoc decision-making bodies to provide them with a forum to
present their cases on equal footing.1
Another explanation might also be at work. Citizens might simply be un-
informed about the relative size of different racial and ethnic groups. The
American public has been lambasted at times for its lack of knowledge about
politics (Carpini and Keeter, 1997). To make matters worse, knowledge (or
lack thereof) can shape outcomes by affecting policy preferences and voting
behavior (Bartels, 1996; Althaus, 1998; Gilens, 2001). More pernicious still
is the effect of misinformation. When people not only lack correct informa-
tion but actively hold incorrect information, it can be a barrier to citizens’
ability to update their preferences in light of new information (Kuklinski
et al., 2003). As a result, if citizens are uninformed, or worse, misinformed
about the actual size of groups in their community, they could base their
representation preferences on false premises.
Are citizens able to accurately perceive the size of racial groups? And are
1On this note, there has been a push among both scholars and practitioners to im-
plement such institutions, generally in a deliberative setting (Fishkin, 1996; Hansen and
Andersen, 2004; Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; Farrar et al., 2010). Mansbridge (1983) ad-
vocates for using deliberation to overcome some of the negative effects of what she dubs
“adversarial” democracy, where sides are pitted against one another. Instead, under delib-
erative settings, stake holders can present their claims and be assured an equal voice (see
Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Examining deliberative democracy in detail is beyond
the scope of the present work.
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these perceptions more or less accurate for local communities? If citizens
do misperceive their community’s racial composition, does this in turn affect
their representation preferences? This chapter examines these questions in
greater detail. I begin by adding racial context to the previous analyses of
treatment effects. The composition of subjects’ communities could alter the
nature of the treatment vignettes, so results from Chapters 3 and 4 are
verified. I then turn to the question of perceptions: do citizens accurately
perceive the racial composition of their communities, and do these percep-
tions matter for representation preferences?
5.1 The importance of context
Local racial context could have two important effects on my analyses. The
first, mentioned above, is that perceptions of racial context could alter citi-
zens’ expectations about what representation should look like. I return to this
point later. The second way context could affect my analyses is by changing
the relative meaning of treatments regarding descriptive representation.
Because treatment vignettes were not conditioned on residential context,2
all subjects were assigned to either 5% black, 15% black, or 50% black. But
whether this composition was deemed fair or not might have to do with
both the treatment condition itself and a given individual’s community de-
mographics. Someone living in a town that is only 5% black might prefer the
2Doing so would require a lookup in a database containing demographic information
on communities and an associated set of treatment conditions to apply to subjects based
on their communities’ demographics. If a subject resides in a community that is 15%
black, he might receive descriptive representation conditions of 0% black, 15% black, and
30% black. Another subject residing in a community that is 30% black might receive
treatment conditions of 15% black, 30% black, and 45% black. While assigning treatment
based on community demographics is theoretically possible, such complicated lookups and
assignment conditions were not feasible with the commercial survey software used for this
experiment.
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low descriptive representation condition because that represents proportional
representation for blacks. That same treatment condition would be well be-
low proportional for someone living in a community that is 40% black.3
For this reason, it is important to verify the earlier findings by conditioning
the treatment on the size of the black population in each subject’s community.
To do so, we need two key pieces of information. First, we need to know
where each subject lives. Second, we need to know something about how
that community is composed.
For the first point, subjects were asked to provide the 5-digit zip-code for
their primary residency.4 Subjects were then matched with a “core based
statistical area” as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Each CBSA refers to
a single metropolitan or micropolitan area. Metropolitan areas are localities
with a population of 50,000 or greater. Micropolitan areas are localities with
between 10,000 and 50,000 persons. This definition of geographic location
means that we will have to omit subjects residing in locations with fewer
than 10,000 residents as well as any subject that did not enter a valid 5-digit
zip-code. This results in the loss of 16 observations that did not have valid
zip-codes that are part of a CBSA. It also bears mentioning that these CBSAs
are metropolitan areas and not distinct political units. So, for example, the
CBSA corresponding with Chicago would include the city itself as well as
any suburbs. So if a respondent provided a zip-code associated with Oak
Park, Illinois, they would be located within the Chicago CBSA5.
3However, Glaser (2003) provides evidence that preferences about racial policies may
not be dependent on racial context in the ways one might think.
4Alternatively, subjects could be located based on the IP address. Because IP addresses
are assigned to internet service providers, geographic location can usually be reliably
determined based solely on IP address. However, this would only provide information on
where the subject took the survey, and not where they actually live. For this reason, self
reported zip-code is a better measure of where subjects actually live.
5This raises the additional question of whether this geographic unit of analysis is the
appropriate one. People might have different perceptions of what the boundaries of their
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After subjects were located within a CBSA, data on the CBSA’s racial
composition was added to determine the percent black in the community.
Data on these CBSA demographics can be found in Table 5.1. Based on the
percent black, a new variable was created capturing whether the descriptive
representation treatment was roughly proportional, above proportional, or
below proportional. If subjects resided in a community that was 0-10% black,
the low descriptive representation condition was recoded as proportional,
and both the medium and high descriptive representation conditions were
recoded as above proportional. If a subject resided in a CBSA that was
10-20% black, the medium descriptive representation condition was recoded
as proportional, the low descriptive representation condition was recoded as
below proportional, and the high descriptive representation condition was
recoded as above proportional. Finally, if a subject resided in a CBSA that
was over 20% black, the high descriptive representation condition was coded
as proportional, and both the low and medium descriptive representation
conditions were recoded as below proportional.6
The treatment distribution resulting from roughly recoding the treatment
into below proportional, proportional, or above proportion is displayed below
in Figure 5.1. This adjustment creates far more subjects who received treat-
ments that were above proportional representation compared to those who
simply received the “high” treatment condition. This recoding of treatment
condition does not affect the substantive outcomes.
community actually are, in addition to their perceptions of the composition of people
within those communities (Wong et al., 2012). Although the present study cannot identify
what exactly subjects view as their community, the results presented below are robust
whether CBSA or zip-codes are used as the unit of aggregation.
6A perhaps simpler test would simply be to add black percent or some other community
demographic characteristic as a covariate. This is less rigorous, as it does not capture how
treatment effects might differ based on the type of community, but doing so yields results
substantively identical to those presented in previous chapters.
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of observed communities
Mean S.D. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
Percent white 77.7 11.6 68.3 79.9 86.3
Percent black 13.9 9.5 6.6 11.9 18.7
Percent Latino 13.7 12.6 4.7 9.3 21.1
Percent Asian 5.3 4.9 2.2 3.8 6.4
Total population 27217 17049 14149 27267 38440
Subjects resided in a total of 276 unique CBSAs. There are
a total of 935 CBSAs in the United States and Puerto Rico
as of 2010.
Figure 5.1: Treatment conditions
Descriptive representation




Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
N=127 N=148 N=199
Favored whites
Treatment 4 Treatment 5 Treatment 6
N=121 N=170 N=178
Rerunning the analyses in Chapter 3, we get the results displayed below
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. For descriptive representation, it is still the case that
below proportional and proportional representation are associated with lower
levels of satisfaction and perceived fairness. For substantive representation,
we still find outcomes favoring whites to be regarded much more negatively
than outcomes favoring blacks. This effect is particularly strong among black
subjects.
The results of the interactive model are not quite as strong once treatment
has been conditioned on each subject’s community demographics. Table 5.4
shows the results from this model. All of the main effects and the interaction
terms for treatment are in the expected direction, but the size and significance
of the coefficients is less than those found in Chapter 4. This suggests that
the central story might be correct, but the results are not quite as robust as
the direct effects of either substantive or descriptive representation.
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Table 5.2: Independent effects of descriptive representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.58 0.02 0.61 0.02 0.58 0.02
Below Proportional -0.08 0.02 -0.12 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Proportional -0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 0.02
Black -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.12 0.05
Black*Below Prop. -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08
Black*Proportional -0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08
Female -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
PartyID -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.13 0.04
Ideology 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01
Table 5.3: Independent effects of substantive representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.58 0.02 0.59 0.02 0.56 0.02
Favors whites -0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.02
Black 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.05
Black*Favors whites -0.18 0.06 -0.11 0.07 -0.22 0.07
Female -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02
PartyID -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.12 0.04
Ideology 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01
What these analyses bring to light is that an ideal research design would
block subjects based on community demographics and then assign levels of
descriptive representation pertinent to that community. To do this, one could
select communities in advance and survey just those residents. That would
allow the greatest control over treatment conditions, because it would allow a
finite number of treatment conditions to be designed before implementation.
A more complicated, yet possible, research design would entail asking sub-
jects for their zip code at the beginning of the survey, and then developing
treatments conditional on their response. Researchers could then program
the survey to assign them treatments that are either proportional, above
proportional (by some pre-define quantity), or below proportional (by some
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Table 5.4: Interactive effects of representation
Community Process Composition
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.59 0.02 0.63 0.02 0.60 0.02
Below Proportional -0.03 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.03
Proportional 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.03
Favors whites -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.06 0.03
Below*Favors whites -0.11 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04
Prop.*Favors whites -0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04
Black -0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.10 0.03
Female 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
PartyID -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.13 0.04
Ideology 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01
pre-defined quantity).
5.2 Determinants of community perceptions
The second major issue posed by the influence of residential context has to do
with ordinary citizens’ shaky grasp of actual community demographics. As
discussed above, the effect of treatment condition might vary as a function
of subjects’ actual community demographics. But treatment might also vary
as a function of subjects’ perceived community demographics.
The idea that people are poor judges of their surroundings is becoming
more prevalent in the social science literature. Wong (2007) finds that both
whites and blacks overestimate the size of the black population, both in the
nation at-large and in their own community. People’s perceptions of the
communities in which they live could drive not only how they experience the
treatments in this experiment, but also what their representation preferences
are. If, for example, a white person living in a community that is 10% black
incorrectly believes that the actual percentage black is close to 50%, then he
might have very different perspectives on the proper amount of descriptive
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and substantive representation. On the descriptive front, if he holds pref-
erences for representatives who are a microcosm of the body politic, then
he should want there to be near parity in the numbers of blacks and whites
representing citizens’ interests. Similarly, if blacks make up 50% of the pop-
ulation, then he should expect policy outcomes to go in favor of blacks with
some regularity.
For this reason, it should be clear that perceptions of community demo-
graphics matter very much for representation preferences. But before we can
investigate how these perceptions matter, we must have a sense of what these
perceptions are. To this end, subjects were asked to give their best guess of
what percent of their community7 is white, black, Latino, and Asian. For
the present purposes, I shall restrict analyses to blacks and whites.
Figure 5.2 shows how blacks’ and whites’ perceptions vary as a function
of actual community demographics. The x-axis displays the percent of the
subject’s CBSA that is black. The y-axis shows the percent of the subject’s
community that he perceives to be black. Because the highest observed black
percent in the data is 48%, the x-axis only extends to 50% (halfway of the
theoretical maximum domain). The points marked by an “x” represent black
subjects; the points marked by an “o” represent white subjects. The black
and grey lines show a fitted line regressing actual percent black on perceived
percent black, for blacks and whites respectively.
Were subjects to perfectly perceive their community, then we should see
the points hovering near the line y = x (marked by a dashed line in Fig-
ure 5.2). Any points falling above this line are over-estimates of the black
population. Any points falling below this line are under-estimates of the
7An open question is what to what geography subjects are referring when they talk
about their community. As Wong et al. (2012) shows, not all citizens think alike when
asked to define their neighborhood or community.
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Figure 5.2: Actual and expected perceptions of community demographics
black population. A majority (58%) of subjects overestimated the percent
black in their community. Although the mean percent black in communi-
ties was 13.8%, the mean percent black perceived by subjects was 18.0%.
And when subjects overestimated the percent black, they tended to do it by
large margins. The mean over-estimate was 12.3%, meaning a person who
over-estimates the black percent in the community puts the percent black at
almost double its actual size.8
8There are also a significant number of people who underestimate percent black. Those
who under-estimated the percent black were off by an average of 7.4%.
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5.2.1 Explaining innumeracy
What explains whites’ and blacks’ misinformation about their own commu-
nity’s demographics? Using the 1996 National Black Election Study, Tate
(2004) finds that blacks’ overestimates of the black population are associated
with gender, education, income, political knowledge, geographic region (the
South vs. non-South), and whether or not the respondent is represented by
a black member of Congress. Similar analyses are presented below in Ta-
ble 5.5. Because we are dealing with both black and white subjects, I also
take into account the subject’s race. And because there are both over- and
underestimates, the dependent variable here is the absolute distance between
a subject’s perception of her community and reality.9
Table 5.5: Explanations of accuracy of racial perceptions
Variable Coef. Std. Error
Intercept 14.26 1.64







The results of this model suggest that the black percent in the commu-
nity, subject’s race, gender, age, and their level of political knowledge are
all explanations of accuracy of racial perceptions. As the percent black in a
community increases, so does the inaccuracy of black percent.10 Black sub-
9An alternative measure could take into account the total percent black in a community
by dividing this absolute distance by the actual percent black. Doing so would give a
measure of how far off a subject’s estimation is as a proportion of the total blacks. This
would weight inaccuracy less heavily when black population sizes are large — missing by
5% should matter less when the total percent black is 40% than when it is 10%. This
alternative construct yields substantively similar findings to those presented below.
10Although it should be noted that the raw size of the black population also increases,
so the amount subjects miss by, proportional to black percent, actually decreases.
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jects tend to be much more inaccurate in their estimates, off by an average
of about 8 percentage points more than their white counterparts. Knowledge
tends to have a strong negative effect on innumeracy of the black popula-
tion. A person who answered all five knowledge items correctly would tend
to be about 8 points more accurate than someone who answered none of the
knowledge items correctly.
5.3 Innumeracy and evaluations of representation
Now that we have some sense of what drives innumeracy about the size of the
black community, we can begin to investigate how this type of misinformation
affects representation preferences. What effect might misinformation about a
person’s community have on evaluations of representation? Existing research
has little information in this regard, but there are two potential ways in which
misinformation might be consequential for representation preferences.
The first explanation is that perceptions of a community’s demographics
will set a baseline against which to compare descriptive representation. If a
person believes that blacks make up 40% of the community, then they would
see 40% black descriptive representation as proportional. If process prefer-
ences are based on proportionality, then this would lead over-estimates of
percent black to warrant correspondingly higher desires for black descriptive
representation. This could explain why both whites and blacks respond neg-
atively even to levels of descriptive representation that are proportional to
the U.S. and to the average community in my sample.
This explanation should be of particular importance to members of the
minority. As Tate (2004) finds, blacks tend to grossly overestimate their own
population size (as well as the number of black members of Congress, albeit
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by much smaller margins). As a result, Tate suggests that a reason for limited
effects for direct descriptive representation might be blacks’ perceptions that
they are grossly underrepresented in Congress. Although blacks are indeed
underrepresented, at the time of Tate’s study, this underrepresentation was
by about 6 percentage points, not by the 27 percentage points perceived by
black respondents.
A second explanation, in operation primarily for members of the majority,
predicts that high perceptions of the percent black in a community should
be related to lower levels of support for high descriptive representation (see
Glaser, 2003). Blumer (1958)’s theory of racial group position suggests that
as members of a dominant group feel that their position is threatened, they
should react negatively to suppress the presumed threat. In the present
context, high estimates of the percent black in the community should thus
be related to higher levels of group threat. As a result of this higher group
threat, we might expect white subjects to reject high levels of descriptive
representation, as it poses a direct threat to their political authority.
5.3.1 Testing effects of perceptions
To begin to test the effects of context on representation preferences, I add
to the previous models a variable capturing the subject’s perceived racial
context (percentage of their community that they estimate is black) as well
as the subject’s objective racial context (the actual percent black in the area
in which they live). A simple model including each of these variables as a
covariate is presented in Table 5.6.
The results of Table 5.6 suggest that neither objective nor subjective racial
context play much of a role in shaping preferences for representation. The
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Table 5.6: Racial context and direct representation preferences
Community Process Satisfaction
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.66 0.02 0.70 0.02 0.66 0.03
Low Descriptive -0.06 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.10 0.03
Med Descriptive -0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.03
Favors whites -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03
Low*Favors whites -0.10 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.06 0.04
Med*Favors whites -0.10 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.06 0.04
Perceived pct black -0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.06
Actual pct black -0.09 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.10
Black -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.09 0.03
independent and joint treatment effects are similar to what was found in
Chapter 4. Both objective and subjective racial context have insignificant
effects on all three outcome variables. Moreover, the direction of effect is
inconsistent across the three outcomes.
What’s more, this null finding is consistent across specifications. If we
look at either aspect of representation in isolation, we find no situations
in which either subjective or objective context has a significant impact on
representation preferences.
Given the explanations laid out above, it is important to investigate con-
text not only as a covariate, but also as a moderator of treatment. If racial
threat is in operation, then we should see higher perceived percent black
associated with lower support for black representation. Similarly, if people
are basing their desire for high substantive representation on an overesti-
mate of the size of the minority, then we should see perceived percent black
have a negative effect on the coefficients attached to low or medium levels of
descriptive representation.
For the sake of simplicity and brevity, I present below only the interaction
results for descriptive representation. The results for substantive representa-
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tion (and a model interacting the two) echo these findings. Table 5.7 shows
the effect of perceived racial context on the treatment effects.
Table 5.7: Racial context and representation preferences
Community Process Satisfaction
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.64 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.63 0.03
Low Descriptive -0.07 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.03
Med Descriptive -0.09 0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.06 0.03
Perceived pct black 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.10
Low*Perceived pct black -0.25 0.13 -0.22 0.13 -0.14 0.14
Med*Perceived pct black 0.02 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.12 0.12
Actual pct black -0.08 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.10
Black -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.03
The results of these analyses suggest that perceived racial context has
negligible effects on peoples’ representation preferences. In the strongest
case, going from the first to third quartile in perceived percent black (0.05
to 0.25) only decreases support for low descriptive representation by about
0.04, and has virtually no effect on support for medium or high levels of
descriptive representation.
If we shift our focus to actual community context, the findings are similarly
bleak. Regardless of whether we use reality or perceptions, a community’s
racial composition does not appear to moderate the effects of treatment.
What this suggests is that people are not basing their evaluations of de-
scriptive and substantive representation on the size of racial groups in their
community.
This is troubling in many ways. If people have at least nominal support for
the idea of proportional representation, then we should see either perceived or
actual community demographics playing a factor in their support for different
levels of descriptive representation. That we do not find this suggests that
people are basing their evaluations of whether 10, 20, or 50 percent black
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representation is fair on something independent from the size of the black
population in their community.
This result also does not offer much support for the premise of group
threat. Group threat would predict that as the size of the black population
increases (or at least if it is perceived to do so), support for policies and
representation favorable to blacks should decrease (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983;
Quillian, 1995). There is no evidence in the present study that representation
preferences are based on group threat, either real or perceived.
We are left, then, with some lingering questions. Why is it that equal de-
scriptive representation seems to be the condition to maximize satisfaction
across groups, when blacks comprise nowhere near 50% of the population?
And if representation preferences are independent of community demograph-
ics, what is driving differences in preferences? Might it be that differences
in perceived national demographics are affecting people’s judgments about
local decision-making? I will withhold speculation on the first point. But
the experiment does have some data that is suggestive of an answer for the
second.
5.3.2 Representation preferences and ideology
What might explain the result of the highest levels of descriptive and substan-
tive representation maximizing satisfaction across both blacks and whites?
That blacks might prefer representational arrangements that maximize their
influence is unsurprising. But the fact that these arrangements are also
viewed most favorable by whites goes against expectations.
I offer one potential explanation for why we might see the greatest satis-
faction among whites when black representation is highest: ideology. Thus
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far in the analyses, I have not conditioned the experimental treatment on
white subjects’ ideology.11 But in fact we might expect that liberal whites
will indeed support high levels of descriptive and substantive representa-
tion for blacks, due to their higher levels of support for egalitarianism and
racially-targeted policies. Conservatives, on the other hand, have tended to
be linked to lower levels of support for such policies.12 As such, we might
expect that liberal whites will respond positively to treatment conditions af-
fording blacks greater representation, whereas conservative whites will tend
to respond negatively to those treatment conditions.
Table 5.8 shows the effects of descriptive and substantive representation
treatment conditions by ideology for white subjects (there is too little ide-
ological variation to conduct similar analyses for black subjects). As you
can see, the results are striking. Those who self identify as more conserva-
tive are much more supportive of low levels of descriptive representation and
substantive outcomes that favor whites.
The interaction between ideology and treatment condition in illustrated
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. For illustrative purposes, only the outcome vari-
able directly measuring satisfaction with the group composition is displayed
for each aspect of representation, although all three outcome variables show
similar effects. The figures demonstrate how ideology alters white subjects’
preferences for representation. Among liberals, satisfaction increases mono-
tonically as black descriptive and substantive representation increase. For
11Doing so for black subjects would accomplish little, given the substantial homogeneity
within the MTurk sample and the population at-large.
12This touches on a related explanation — symbolic racism. A long-standing debate
among scholars of race has been whether white attitudes towards race-based policies were
the effect of ideology, racism, or a combination of both. These dimensions tend to be re-
lated, but there is no consensus on which is the primary motivator of white racial attitudes.
Because I do not have a measure of racial prejudice or symbolic racism, I must remain
agnostic on this point (cf. Kinder and Sears, 1981; Bobo, 1983; Feldman and Huddy, 2004).
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Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Intercept 0.63 0.03 0.63 0.02
Low Descriptive -0.14 0.04
Med Descriptive -0.11 0.04
Ideology 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Ideology*Low Descriptive 0.02 0.02
Ideology*Med Descriptive 0.01 0.02
Favors whites -0.19 0.03
Ideology*Favors whites 0.08 0.02
conservatives, substantive outcomes that favor blacks are viewed as less sat-
isfactory (and less fair) than outcomes favoring whites. And decision-making
bodies that are composed of equal numbers of blacks and whites are viewed
less favorably than groups in which blacks receive less descriptive represen-
tation.
5.4 Context, ideology, and the prospects for
maximizing satisfaction
The lack of a relationship between either actual or perceived community
demographics does not pose serious problems for the prospects of satisfying
both whites and blacks in the abstract. It could be the case that people take
their cues about how much representation groups in society should have from
some broader phenomenon, such as the size of groups in the nation at-large
or the relative socioeconomic status of groups.
From this lack of a contextual effect, the proscription for designing institu-
tions should be clear. If we fully believe the experimental results presented in


































Figure 5.3: Moderating effect of ideology on descriptive representation
tation of minorities, even if that means boosting descriptive representation
above what would be proportional in a given community.
But there is one major caveat that calls into question the ability of rep-
resentation to satisfy all groups in society: ideology. Although the analy-
ses presented in this chapter were exploratory, the indication is that there
are deep differences in how liberals and conservatives view the fairness of
decision-making processes contingent on their racial makeup and policy out-
put.






























Favors whites Favors blacks
l Liberals
Conservatives
Figure 5.4: Moderating effect of ideology on substantive representation
representation for blacks. Achieving these high levels would satisfy liberals
(who view such arrangements as the most fair), as well as blacks (who be-
come indifferent to policy outcome when descriptive representation is high).
But conservatives, on the other hand, seem to react quite negatively when
descriptive representation reaches parity or outcomes favor a numerical mi-
nority group. As a result, efforts to boost descriptive representation for




This dissertation began with the example of racial violence in the 1960s. Al-
though enhancing representation is no panacea for racial animus and tension,
there is some evidence to suggest that heightening minority groups’ repre-
sentation (particularly descriptive representation) can help to address some
of the endemic concerns of minority communities.
The preceding chapters explored how levels of descriptive and substantive
representation affected ratings of fairness of and satisfaction with democratic
decision-making. From this experiment, it appears as though representation
preferences play an important role in shaping evaluations of government out-
comes. Among minorities involved in this experiment, the results suggest
that priorities tend to be placed on receiving high representation on decision-
making bodies (in this case, 50% representation — above proportional in
every community observed in the data set).
While no one would argue that having more black police in Oakland would
have prevented the rise of violent black nationalism, the general findings
regarding procedural justice and support for anti-system behavior do suggest
that descriptive representation might matter. If descriptive representation is
associated with higher levels of satisfaction with government, it also might
be associated with higher perceptions of procedural justice and a higher
willingness to accept the legitimate authority of democratic institutions.
The results of the experiment reported on above are suggestive of such
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relationships, but we should be cautious in extrapolating too much from the
study itself. What we can say is that there are clear direct and interactive
effects of descriptive and substantive representation, and that these effects
indicate that members of minority groups are indeed willing to make tradeoffs
between aspects of representation.
6.1 Direct effects of representation
Chapter 3 presented results showing the direct effect of descriptive and
substantive representation on evaluations of fairness and satisfaction with
decision-making. All three outcome measures responded similarly to levels
of descriptive and substantive representation.
For blacks, increases in black descriptive representation caused higher rat-
ings of the fairness of the process, the fairness of decision-making to the whole
community, and satisfaction with the composition of the committee. This
was in line with a priori expectations. As either aspect of representation
increases, we should see higher satisfaction with government.
A similar finding resulted for blacks and substantive representation. When
the outcome favored the black neighborhood, blacks were significantly more
positive about the decision-making process. The results for substantive and
descriptive representation are supportive of Hypothesis 1.
What is interesting is that whites’ evaluations were affected in a similar
manner to the evaluations of blacks. Rather than higher black representation
triggering a backlash, higher black representation appears to correspond to
higher levels of satisfaction with the decision-making and perceptions of its
fairness among whites.
This suggests that Hypothesis 4 is not supported. Not only are whites
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not indifferent to level of descriptive representation, they appear to actively
prefer higher black descriptive representation.
6.2 Tradeoffs between aspects of representation
An important point with respect to members of permanent minority groups
is how they will (or will not) make tradeoffs between aspects of representa-
tion. Even though the direct effects suggest that the optimal configuration
would be for high descriptive and substantive representation for minority
groups, this obviously is untenable in any situations in which the majority
and minority groups hold oppositional positions.
In cases where blacks and whites hold opposing views, it is important
to know whether descriptive representation might actually compensate for
policy losses. Although consistent policy failures might have some deleterious
effects on blacks, evidence from this experiment suggest that, at least in a one-
shot scenario, descriptive representation can compensate for policy failures.
This evidence is in line with what was expected by Hypotheses 2 and 3. If
this compensatory effect of descriptive representation holds more generally,
then designers of democratic institutions might have a means to address
the persistently lower levels of engagement and trust among the minority
community.
6.3 Future directions
Given the research findings above, there are a number of directions that fu-
ture research could take. Three areas in particular warrant highlighting. The
first is improving upon the data presented here. The second is investigating
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different decision-making domains. The third is investigating how to attain
high levels of descriptive representation.
On the first point, one of the limitations of the data analysis in this project
has been the source of the data. Using MTurk as a data source could be seen
as problematic for a number of reasons (the analyses of Berinsky, Huber and
Lenz (2012) notwithstanding). Some have raised concerns about the gener-
alizability of internet samples to begin with (e.g., Malhotra and Krosnick,
2007). Even if this is not a concern, there are some concerns with MTurk
data in particular.
For the present purposes MTurk samples are not ideal due to their low
numbers of black workers. MTurk samples tend to have only around 5%
black according to Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012). The sample used here
actually was somewhat higher than this mark. Still, the percent black in the
sample used for the analyses here is a poor approximation of the national
average (a problem commonly confronted by survey research that does not
include an oversample of blacks).
To that end, it would be beneficial to re-run the analyses presented here on
a nationally representative sample. This would accomplish two goals. First,
it would boost the number of blacks in the sample and thereby increase our
power in explaining how representation affects their ratings of fairness and
satisfaction. Second, it would allow us to test the exploratory analyses in
Chapter 5 in a more rigorous manner.
Fortunately, data collection of a national sample replicating the results pre-
sented here has already been completed. The treatment vignettes, outcome
variables, and measures of perceived community demographics were placed
on a wave of the 2012 CCAP election study. This study uses a national
probability sample, and so should a far more representative sample of the
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U.S. population than MTurk workers. Moreover, the increased length of the
study allows for more potential explanatory variables. In sum, this source
of data should greatly improve the generalizability of the results presented
here.
A second potential expansion of this research could include investigating
other issue domains. The issue investigated here was nonpartisan and locally
focused. I argue that this was appropriate for the purposes of this study —
identifying how people evaluate different aspects of representation — but it
certainly is uncharacteristic of a great many issues in American politics.
Future studies could investigate the roles of descriptive and substantive
representation when partisan cues are available. This has the potential for
substantially changing the dynamics of aspects of representation. If exposed
to a party cue, the salience of substantive outcomes might be far greater than
observed under the present conditions. One could easily hypothesize that in
a highly partisan decision, the importance of the substantive outcome would
be far greater than when the decision is nominally non-partisan.
A third area of continuation from this research is how best to attain high
levels of descriptive representation. The present study suggests that de-
scriptive representation can compensate for unfavorable policy outcomes for
blacks. As a result, democratic practitioners might seek to create institutions
that afford minority groups a greater voice in the decision-making process,
even if that does not translate into a greater likelihood of achieving those
groups’ preferred policies.
But an open question is how best to boost descriptive representation to the
levels necessary to compensate for unfavorable policy outcomes. For example,
if we were to set up deliberative institutions to bring in participants from
the minority community, how could we best ensure that minorities would
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participate at all? As Sanders (1997) argues, not all groups are equally
equipped to participate in such scenarios. As a result, a large number of
minorities might opt out of participating, hamstringing any efforts to boost
descriptive representation. To this end, scholars could investigate how best
to structure institutions such that high levels of descriptive representation
result.
A final point worth mentioning is the question these results raise about
the nature of substantive representation for members of the majority. The
treatment vignettes used in this study were designed specifically to evoke
a race-sensitive response. In the treatments, the outcome either favored
a white neighborhood or a black neighborhood. The assumption implicit
in this was that the outcome favoring the white neighborhood would be a
favorable substantive outcome for whites and the converse would be true
for blacks. But in actuality, whites seemed to prefer an outcome favoring
the black neighborhood. This suggests that in the treatment, the outcome
favored by whites was not the outcome that was more beneficial for their
racial in-group.
Another way of stating this is that there seemed to be broad consensus
about which policy outcome was preferred across both groups. For both
blacks and whites, a decision to build a school in the black neighborhood
elicited more favorable responses than the decision to build a school in a white
neighborhood. As such, this might not be a critical test of tradeoffs between
substantive and descriptive representation. Ideally, the policy decision would
be such that blacks and whites differed in their preferred outcome. In such
a situation, it would be much more telling if whites were still willing to cede
representation to blacks.
There are a number of possible explanations for why there might have been
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broad consensus on the preferred policy outcome. First, it might have been
the case that most respondents were indifferent between the two outcomes.
Since the vignette stated that both neighborhoods were equally deserving and
needing of the school, it may have made determining a preferred outcome
difficult for most respondents. Second, unmentioned concerns, such as socioe-
conomic status, might have been at play. If people extrapolated information
about the neighborhoods based on their racial composition, then that infor-
mation might have played the pivotal role. For example, if people perceive
most black neighborhoods to be relatively poor and most white neighbor-
hoods to be relatively well-off, then respondents might have preferred the
outcome favorable to blacks because of their perceived worse socioeconomic
status. Unfortunately, the present study does not allow us to adjudicate
between these competing alternatives, and so it will fall on future work to
investigate more fully the situations in which members of minority groups
and the majority are willing to make hard tradeoffs between descriptive and
substantive representation.
6.4 Representation and the prospects for maximizing
satisfaction
Overall, this project has presented fairly optimistic findings for the prospects
of maximizing satisfaction across groups in society. For both members of a
minority group and the majority, decision-making situations that involve
high levels of descriptive representation cause higher ratings of fairness and
satisfaction.
What is important to note here is not only that blacks appear willing to
make the trade substantive outcome for equal representation, but that whites
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appear equally willing to accept such decision-making bodies. This suggests
that there might not be significant backlash against institutions that contain
equal numbers of blacks and whites.
This result appears to hold regardless of the type of community in which
people live. The results presented here offer little support for racial context as
a moderator of the effects of representation. For this reason, diverse decision-
making bodies might be possible even in communities that are predominantly
white.
One caveat to keep in mind, of course, is the exploratory finding regarding
ideology. Although blacks and liberal whites appear to see eye-to-eye with
regards to optimal levels of descriptive representation and policy outcomes,
this is less true in the case of conservatives. For conservatives, there appears
to be a significant backlash against decisions that favor blacks, and a less
pronounced backlash to high levels of descriptive representation.
Because this result holds regardless of racial context, it suggests that some
people might simply be ideologically opposed to boosting the representation
of minorities. If this is the case, it might suggest that maximizing satisfaction






5-digit Zip Code for your primary residence
Age
Gender






– Native American/Alaska Native
– Other/Multi-racial
– Decline to respond
A.1.2 Partisanship and ideology






(If respondent identified with a party): Would you say you consider
yourself to be a strong [Republican/Democrat] or not very strong?
– Strong
– Not very strong
(If respondent identified as an Independent): As an independent, would












A.1.3 Political interest and knowledge
Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public
affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not.
Others aren’t that interested. Would you say you follow what’s going
on in government and public affairs?
– Most of the time
– Some of the time
– Only now and then
– Hardly at all
How much do you know about politics relative to the average person?
– A great deal less
– Somewhat less
– About the same amount
– Somewhat more
– A great deal more
Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the










Which of the political parties is more conservative than the other at
the national level, Democrats or Republicans? (order randomized)
– Democrats
– Republicans
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to
override a presidential veto? (order randomized)
– Bare majority (50% + 1)
– Two-thirds majority
– Three-fourths majority
What is the main duty of the U.S. Congress (order randomized)
– To write legislation
– To administer the President’s policies
– To supervise states’ governments
A.1.4 Community demographics (order of questions
randomized)
Just your best guess - what percentage of the population in your com-
munity is African American?
Just your best guess - what percentage of the population in your com-
munity is white?
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Just your best guess - what percentage of the population in your com-
munity is Latino?
Just your best guess - what percentage of the population in your com-
munity is Asian American?
A.1.5 Treatment vignette
Suppose your community’s local government has appointed a committee con-
sisting of 20 registered voters from the community. The purpose of the com-
mittee is to recommend the location of a new school, which will replace an
existing school. Chances are high that this is the last new school your com-
munity will be able to build in a long time.
The committee identified two equally deserving locations. Each of the lo-
cations badly needs a new school. They differ in that one of the locations is in
a predominantly white neighborhood, the other location in a predominantly
African-American neighborhood.
This committee consisting of [18/15/10] white members and [2/5/10] black
members has been holding hearings through the community and just an-
nounced its decision: the new school will replace the old school in the
[white/black] neighborhood.
A.1.6 Dependent variables (order of questions randomized)





– Neither fair nor unfair
– Unfair
– Very unfair
Given this racial composition how fair was this decision to whites?
– Very fair
– Fair
– Neither fair nor unfair
– Unfair
– Very unfair




– Neither fair nor unfair
– Unfair
– Very unfair
How fair was the decision-making process itself?
– Very fair
– Fair




How satisfied would you be with a decision-making body in your com-
munity with this racial composition?
– Very satisfied
– Satisfied
– Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied
– Unsatisfied
– Very unsatisfied
A.2 Balance across treatments
A concern often raised with experiments is balance across treatment condi-
tions. The challenge posed by imbalance is that observed treatment effects
could be driven by there being more of a certain “type” of subject in one
treatment condition than in another. For example, let’s assume that sub-
stantive representation actually has no effect, but that blacks simply tend
to have lower satisfaction with government. If we happened to have sub-
stantially more blacks in the “Outcome favors whites” treatment condition,
then we might conclude that substantive outcomes favoring whites decreases
satisfaction, when in reality the difference was simply due to racial imbalance
in random assignment.
Table A.1 shows the distribution across treatment conditions of a number
of potential covariates that could influence experimental results. Since the
total number of subjects is large, there is less of a concern with imbalance.
And indeed, gender, race, partisanship, and ideology all appear to be bal-
anced across treatment conditions. The results of χ2 tests for these variables
all fail to reject the null (p-values are 0.85, 0.76, 0.92, and 0.27 for gender,
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race, party, and ideology, respectively). As such, we can be fairly confident
that experimental results are not being driven by imbalance, at least on these
observed characteristics.
Table A.1: Covariate balance across treatment conditions
Outcome favors whites Outcome favors blacks
Low Medium High Low Medium High N
Female 68 77 70 64 78 65 422
White 151 157 135 137 172 135 887
Black 16 13 12 8 15 15 79
Democrat 71 72 58 64 83 60 408
Republican 66 67 58 63 66 61 381
Liberal 79 85 62 84 98 81 489
Moderate 55 53 44 38 44 40 274
Conservative 29 30 35 22 38 24 178
Total N 167 170 146 145 185 148 961
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